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EQUILIBRIUM IN RISK-SHARING GAMES
MICHAIL ANTHROPELOS AND CONSTANTINOS KARDARAS
Abstract. The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can
heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where
agents’ strategic sets consist of all possible sharing securities and pricing kernels that are consistent
with Arrow-Debreu sharing rules. First, it is shown that agents’ best response problems have unique
solutions. The risk-sharing Nash equilibrium admits a finite-dimensional characterisation and it is
proved to exist for arbitrary number of agents and be unique in the two-agent game. In equilibrium,
agents declare beliefs on future random outcomes different than their actual probability assessments,
and the risk-sharing securities are endogenously bounded, implying (among other things) loss of
efficiency. In addition, an analysis regarding extremely risk tolerant agents indicates that they
profit more from the Nash risk-sharing equilibrium as compared to the Arrow-Debreu one.
Introduction
The structure of securities that optimally allocate risky positions under heterogeneous beliefs of
agents has been a subject of ongoing research. Starting from the seminal works of [Bor62], [Arr63],
[BJ79] and [Buh84], the existence and characterisation of welfare risk sharing of random posi-
tions in a variety of models has been extensively studied—see, among others, [BEK05], [JST08],
[Acc07], [FS08]. On the other hand, discrepancies amongst agents regarding their assessments
on the probability of future random outcomes reinforce the existence of mutually beneficial trad-
ing opportunities (see e.g. [Var85], [Var89], [BCGT00]). However, market imperfections—such as
asymmetric information, transaction costs and oligopolies—spur agents to act strategically and
prevent markets from reaching maximum efficiency. In the financial risk-sharing literature, the
impact of asymmetric or private information has been addressed under both static and dynamic
models (see, among others, [NN94], [MR00], [Par04], [Axe07], [Wil11]). The importance of frictions
like transaction costs has be highlighted in [AG91]; see also [CRW12].
The present work aims to contribute to the risk-sharing literature by focusing on how over-
the-counter (OTC) transactions with a small number of agents motivate strategic behaviour. The
vast majority of real-world sharing instances involves only a few participants, each of whom may
influence the way heterogeneous risks and beliefs are going to be allocated. (The seminal papers
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[Kyl89] and [Vay99] highlight such transactions.) As an example, two financial institutions with
possibly different beliefs, and in possession of portfolios with random future payoffs, may negotiate
and design innovative asset-backed securities that mutually share their defaultable assets. Broader
discussion on risk-sharing innovative securities is given in the classic reference [AG94] and in [Tuf03];
a list of widely used such securities is provided in [Fin92].
As has been extensively pointed out in the literature (see, for example, [Var89] and [SX03]), it is
reasonable, and perhaps even necessary, to assume that agents have heterogeneous beliefs, which
we identify with subjective probability measures on the considered state space. In fact, differences
in subjective beliefs do not necessarily stem from asymmetric information; agents usually apply
different tools or models for the analysis and interpretation of common sets of information.
Formally, a risk-sharing transaction consists of security payoffs and their prices, and since only
few institutions (typically, two) are involved, it is natural to assume that no social planner for the
transaction exists, and that the equilibrium valuation and payoffs will result as the outcome of
a symmetric game played among the participating institutions. Since institutions’ portfolios are
(at least, approximately) known, the main ingredient of risk-sharing transactions leaving room for
strategic behaviour is the beliefs that each institution reports for the sharing. We propose a novel
way of modelling such strategic actions where the agents’ strategic set consists of the beliefs that
each one chooses to declare (as opposed to their actual one) aiming to maximise individual utility,
and the induced game leads to an equilibrium sharing. Our main insights are summarised below.
Main contributions. The payoff and valuation of the risk-sharing securities are endogenously
derived as an outcome of agents’ strategic behaviour, under constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA)
preferences. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first instance that models the way agents
choose the beliefs on future uncertain events that they are going to declare to their counterparties,
and studies whether such strategic behaviour results in equilibrium. Our results demonstrate how
the game leads to risk-sharing inefficiency and security mispricing, both of which are quantitatively
characterised in analytic forms. More importantly, it is shown that equilibrium securities have
endogenous limited liability, a feature that, while usually suboptimal, is in fact observed in practice.
Although the agents’ set of strategic choices is infinite-dimensional, one of our main contri-
butions is to show that Nash equilibrium admits a finite-dimensional characterisation, with the
dimensionality being one less than the number of participating agents. Not only does our charac-
terisation provide a concrete algorithm for calculating the equilibrium transaction, it also allows to
prove existence of Nash equilibrium for arbitrary number of players. In the important case of two
participating agents, we even show that Nash equilibrium is unique. It has to be pointed out that
the aforementioned results are obtained under complete generality on the probability space and the
involved random payoffs—no extra assumption except from CARA preferences is imposed. While
certain qualitative analysis could be potentially carried out without the latter assumption on the
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entropic form of agent utilities, the advantage of CARA preferences utilised in the present paper
is that they also allow for substantial quantitative analysis, as workable expressions are obtained
for Nash equilibrium.
Our notion of Nash risk-sharing equilibrium highlights the importance of agents’ risk tolerance
level. More precisely, one of the main findings of this work is that agents with sufficiently low risk
aversion will prefer the risk-sharing game rather than the outcome of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
that would have resulted from absence of strategic behaviour. Interestingly, the result is valid
irrespective of their actual risky position or their subjective beliefs. It follows that even risk-averse
agents, as long as their risk-aversion is sufficiently low, will prefer risk-sharing markets that are
thin (i.e., where participating agents are few and have the power to influence the transaction),
resulting in aggregate loss of risk-sharing welfare.
Discussion. Our model is introduced in Section 1, and consists of a two-period financial economy
with uncertainty, containing possibly infinite states of the world. Such infinite-dimensionality
is essential in our framework, since in general the risks that agents encounter do not have a-
priori bounds, and we do not wish to enforce any restrictive assumption on the shape of the
probability distribution or the support of agents’ positions. Let us also note that, even if the
analysis was carried out in a simpler set-up of a finite state space, there would not be any significant
simplification in the mathematical treatment.
In the economy we consider a finite number of agents, each of whom has subjective beliefs
(probability measure) about the events at the time of uncertainty resolution. We also allow agents
to be endowed with a (cumulative, up to the point of uncertainty resolution) random endowment.
Agents seek to increase their expected utilities through trading securities that allocate the dis-
crepancies of their beliefs and risky exposures in an optimal way. The possible disagreement on
agents’ beliefs is assumed on the whole probability space, and not only on the laws of the shared-
to-be risky positions. Such potential disagreement is important: it alone can give rise to mutually
beneficial trading opportunities, even if agents have no risky endowments to share, by actually
designing securities with payoffs written on the events where probability assessments are different.
Each sharing rule consists of the security payoff that each agent is going to obtain and a valuation
measure under which all imaginable securities are priced. The sharing rules that efficiently allocate
any submitted discrepancy of beliefs and risky exposures are the ones stemming from Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium. (Under CARA preferences, the optimal sharing rules have been extensively studied—
see, for instance, [Bor62], [BJ79] and [BEK05].) In principle, participating agents would opt for
the highest possible aggregate benefit from the risk-sharing transaction, as this would increase
their chance for personal gain. However, in the absence of a social planner that could potentially
impose a truth-telling mechanism, it is reasonable to assume that agents do not negotiate the rules
that will allocate the submitted endowments and beliefs. In fact, we assume that agents adapt the
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specific sharing rules that are consistent with the ones resulting from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium,
treating reported beliefs as actual ones, since we regard these sharing rules to be the most natural
and universally regarded as efficient.
Agreement on the structure of risk-sharing securities is also consistent with what is observed in
many OTC transactions involving security design, where the contracts signed by institutions are
standardised and adjusted according to required inputs (in this case, the agents’ reported beliefs).
Such pre-agreement on sharing rules reduces negotiation time, hence the related transaction costs.
Examples are asset-backed securities, whose payoffs are backed by issuers’ random incomes, traded
among banks and investors in a standardised form, as well as credit derivatives, where portfolios
of defaultable assets are allocated among financial institutions and investors.
Combinations of strategic and competitive stages are widely used in the literature of financial
innovation and risk-sharing, under a variety of different guises. The majority of this literature
distinguishes participants among designers (or issuers) of securities and investors who trade them.
In [DJ89], a security-design game is played among exchanges, each aiming to maximise internal
transaction volume; while security design throughout exchanges is the outcome of non-competitive
equilibrium, investors trade securities in a competitive manner. Similarly, in [Bis98], Nash equi-
librium determines not only the designed securities among financial intermediaries, but also the
bid-ask spread that price-taking investors have to face in the second (perfect competition) stage
of market equilibrium. In [CRW12], it is entrepreneurs who strategically design securities that
investors with non-securitised hedging needs competitively trade. In [RZ09], the role of security-
designers is played by arbitrageurs who issue innovated securities in segmented markets. Mixture of
strategic and competitive stages has also been used in models with asymmetric information. For in-
stance, in [Bra05] a two-stage equilibrium game is used to model security design among agents with
private information regarding their effort. In a first stage, agents strategically issue novel financial
securities; in the second stage, equilibrium on the issued securities is formed competitively.
Our framework models oligopolistic OTC security design, where participants are not distin-
guished regarding their information or ability to influence market equilibrium. Agents mutually
agree to apply Arrow-Debreu sharing rules, since these optimally allocate whatever is submitted for
sharing, and also strategically choose the inputs of the sharing-rules (their beliefs, in particular).
Given the agreed-upon rules, agents propose accordingly consistent securities and valuation mea-
sures, aiming to maximise their own expected utility. As explicitly explained in the text, proposing
risk-sharing securities and a valuation kernel is in fact equivalent to agents reporting beliefs to be
considered for sharing. Knowledge of the probability assessments of the counterparties may result
in a readjustment of the probability measure an agent is going to report for the transaction. In
effect, agents form a game by responding to other agents’ submitted probability measures; the
fixed point of this game (if it exists) is called Nash risk-sharing equilibrium.
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The first step of analysing Nash risk-sharing equilibria is to address the well-posedness of an
agent’s best response problem, which is the purpose of Section 2. Agents have motive to exploit
other agents’ reported beliefs and hedging needs and drive the sharing transaction as to maximise
their own utility. Each agent’s strategic choice set consists of all possible probability measures
(equivalent to a baseline measure), and the optimal one is called best probability response. Al-
though this is a highly non-trivial infinite-dimensional maximisation problem, we use a bare-hands
approach to establish that it admits a unique solution. It is shown that the beliefs that an agent
declares coincide with the actual ones only in the special case where the agent’s position cannot be
improved by any transaction with other agents. By resorting to examples, one may gain more intu-
ition on how future risk appears under the lens of agents’ reported beliefs. Consider, for instance,
two financial institutions adapting distinct models for estimating the likelihood of the involved
risks. The sharing contract designed by the institutions will result from individual estimation of
the joint distribution of the shared-to-be risky portfolios. According to the best probability re-
sponse procedure, each institution tends to use less favourable assessment for its own portfolio
than the one based on its actual beliefs, and understates the downside risk of its counterparty’s
portfolio. Example 2.8 contains an illustration of such a case.
An important consequence of applying the best probability response is that the corresponding
security that the agent wishes to acquire has bounded liability. If only one agent applies the
proposed strategic behaviour, the received security payoff is bounded below (but not necessarily
bounded above). In fact, the arguments and results of the best response problem receive extra
attention and discussion in the paper, since they demonstrate in particular the value of the proposed
strategic behaviour in terms of utility increase. This situation applies to markets where one large
institution trades with a number of small agents, each of whom has negligible market power.
A Nash-type game occurs when all agents apply the best probability response strategy. In Sec-
tion 3, we characterise Nash equilibrium as the solution of a certain finite-dimensional problem.
Based on this characterisation, we establish existence of Nash risk-sharing equilibrium for an ar-
bitrary (finite) number of agents. In the special case of two-agent games, the Nash equilibrium is
shown to be unique. The finite-dimensional characterisation of Nash equilibrium also provides an
algorithm that can be used to approximate the Nash equilibrium transaction by standard numerical
procedures, such as Monte Carlo simulation.
Having Nash equilibrium characterised, we are able to further perform a joint qualitative and
quantitative analysis. Not only do we verify the expected fact that, in any non-trivial case, Nash
risk-sharing securities are different from the Arrow-Debreu ones, but we also provide analytic
formulas for their shapes. Since the securities that correspond to the best probability response
are bounded from below, the application of such strategy from all the agents yields that the Nash
risk-sharing market-clearing securities are also bounded from above. This comes in stark contrast
to Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, and implies in particular an important loss of efficiency. We measure
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the risk-sharing inefficiency that is caused by the game via the difference between the aggregate
monetary utilities at Arrow-Debreu and Nash equilibria, and provide an analytic expression for
it. (Note that inefficient allocation of risk in symmetric-information thin market models may also
occur when securities are exogenously given—see e.g. [RW15]. When securities are endogenously
designed, [CRW12] highlights that imperfect competition among issuers results in risk-sharing
inefficiency, even if securities is traded among perfectly competitive investors.)
One may wonder whether the revealed agents’ subjective beliefs in Nash equilibrium are far
from their actual subjective probability measures, which would be unappealing from a modelling
viewpoint. Extreme departures from actual beliefs are endogenously excluded in our model, as
the distance of the truth from reported beliefs in Nash equilibrium admits a-priori bounds. Even
though agents are free to choose any probability measure that supposedly represents their beliefs in
a risk-sharing transaction, and they do indeed end up choosing probability measures different than
their actual ones, this departure cannot be arbitrarily large if the market is to reach equilibrium.
Turning our attention to Nash-equilibrium valuation, we show that the pricing probability mea-
sure can be written as a certain convex combination of the individual agents’ marginal indifference
valuation measures. The weights of this convex combination depend on agents’ relative risk tol-
erance coefficients, and, as it turns out, the Nash-equilibrium valuation measure is closer to the
marginal valuation measure of the more risk-averse agents. This fact highlights the importance
of risk tolerance coefficients in assessing the gain or loss of utility for individual agents in Nash
risk-sharing equilibrium; in fact, it implies that more risk tolerant agents tend to get better cash
compensation as a result of the Nash game than what they would get in Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
Inspired by the involvement of the risk tolerance coefficients in the agents’ utility gain or loss,
in Section 4 we focus on induced Arrow-Debreu and Nash equilibria of two-agent games, when
one of the agents’ preferences approach risk neutrality. We first establish that both equilibria
converge to well-defined limits. Notably, it is shown that an extremely risk tolerant agent drives
the market to the same equilibrium regardless of whether the other agent acts strategically or
plainly submits true subjective beliefs. In other words, extremely risk tolerant agents tend to
dominate the risk-sharing transaction. The study of limiting equilibria indicates that, although
there is loss of aggregate utility when agents act strategically, there is always utility gain in the
Nash transaction as compared to Arrow-Debreu equilibrium for the extremely risk-tolerant agent,
regardless of the risk tolerance level and subjective beliefs of the other agent. Extremely risk-
tolerant agents are willing to undertake more risk in exchange of better cash compensation; under
the risk-sharing game, they respond to the risk-averse agent’s hedging needs and beliefs by driving
the market to higher price for the security they short. This implies that agents with sufficiently
high risk tolerance—although still not risk-neutral—will prefer thin markets. The case where both
acting agents uniformly approach risk-neutrality is also treated, where it is shown that the limiting
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Nash equilibrium sharing securities equal half of the limiting Arrow-Debreu equilibrium securities,
hinting towards the fact that Nash risk-sharing equilibrium results in loss of trading volume.
For convenience of reading, all the proofs of the paper are placed in Appendix A.
1. Optimal Sharing of Risk
1.1. Notation. The symbols “N” and “R” will be used to denote the set of all natural and real
numbers, respectively. As will be evident subsequently in the paper, we have chosen to use the
symbol “R” to denote (reported, or revealed) probabilities.
In all that follows, random variables are defined on a standard probability space (Ω, F , P). We
stress that no finiteness restriction is enforced on the state space Ω. We use P for the class of
all probabilities that are equivalent to the baseline probability P. For Q ∈ P, we use “EQ” to
denote expectation under Q. The space L0 consists of all (equivalence classes, modulo almost sure
equality) finitely-valued random variables endowed with the topology of convergence in probability.
This topology does not depend on the representative probability from P, and L0 may be infinite-
dimensional. For Q ∈ P, L1(Q) consists of all X ∈ L0 with EQ [|X|] < ∞. We use L∞ for the
subset of L0 consisting of essentially bounded random variables.
Whenever Q1 ∈ P and Q2 ∈ P, dQ2/dQ1 denotes the (strictly positive) density of Q2 with
respect to Q1. The relative entropy of Q2 ∈ P with respect to Q1 ∈ P is defined via
H(Q2 |Q1) := EQ1
[
dQ2
dQ1
log
(
dQ2
dQ1
)]
= EQ2
[
log
(
dQ2
dQ1
)]
∈ [0,∞].
For X ∈ L0 and Y ∈ L0, we write X ∼ Y if and only if there exists c ∈ R such that Y = X + c.
In particular, we shall use this notion of equivalence to ease notation on probability densities:
for Q1 ∈ P and Q2 ∈ P, we shall write log (dQ2/dQ1) ∼ Λ to mean that exp(Λ) ∈ L1(Q1) and
dQ2/dQ1 = (EQ1 [exp(Λ)])−1 exp(Λ).
1.2. Agents and preferences. We consider a market with a single future period, where all un-
certainty is resolved. In this market, there are n + 1 economic agents, where n ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .};
for concreteness, define the index set I = {0, . . . , n}. Agents derive utility only from the consump-
tion of a nume´raire in the future, and all considered security payoffs are expressed in units of this
nume´raire. In particular, future deterministic amounts have the same present value for the agents.
The preference structure of agent i ∈ I over future random outcomes is numerically represented
via the concave exponential utility functional
(1.1) L0 3 X 7→ Ui(X) := −δi logEPi [exp (−X/δi)] ∈ [−∞,∞),
where δi ∈ (0,∞) is the agent’s risk tolerance and Pi ∈ P represents the agent’s subjective beliefs.
For any X ∈ L0, agent i ∈ I is indifferent between the cash amount Ui(X) and the corresponding
risky position X; in other words, Ui(X) is the certainty equivalent of X ∈ L0 for agent i ∈ I.
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Note that the functional −Ui is an entropic risk measure in the terminology of convex risk measure
literature—see, amongst others, [FS04, Chapter 4].
Define the aggregate risk tolerance δ :=
∑
i∈I δi, as well as the relative risk tolerance λi := δi/δ
for all i ∈ I. Note that ∑i∈I λi = 1. Finally, set δ−i := δ − δi and λ−i := 1− λi, for all i ∈ I.
1.3. Subjective probabilities and endowments. Preference structures that are numerically
represented via (1.1) are rich enough to include the possibility of already existing portfolios of
random positions for acting agents. To wit, suppose that P˜i ∈ P are the actual subjective beliefs
of agent i ∈ I, who also carries a risky future payoff in units of the nume´raire. Following standard
terminology, we call this cumulative (up to the point of resolution of uncertainty) payoff random
endowment, and denote it by Ei ∈ L0. In this set-up, adding on top of Ei a payoff X ∈ L0 for agent
i ∈ I results in numerical utility equal to U˜i(X) := −δi logEP˜i [exp (−(X + Ei)/δi)]. Assume that
U˜i(0) > −∞, i.e., that exp (−Ei/δi) ∈ L1
(
P˜i
)
. Defining Pi ∈ P via log
(
dPi/dP˜i
) ∼ −Ei/δi and
Ui via (1.1), Ui(X) = U˜i(X) − U˜i(0) holds for all X ∈ L0. Hence, hereafter, the probability Pi is
understood to incorporate any possible random endowment of agent i ∈ I, and utility is measured
in relative terms, as difference from the baseline level U˜i(0).
Taking the above discussion into account, we stress that agents are completely characterised
by their risk tolerance level and (endowment-modified) subjective beliefs, i.e., by the collection of
pairs (δi,Pi)i∈I . In other aspects, and unless otherwise noted, agents are considered symmetric
(regarding information, bargaining power, cost of risk-sharing participation, etc).
1.4. Geometric-mean probability. We introduce a method that produces a geometric mean of
probabilities which will play central role in our discussion. Fix (Ri)i∈I ∈ PI . In view of Ho¨lder’s
inequality,
∏
i∈I (dRi/dP)
λi ∈ L1(P) holds. Therefore, one may define Q ∈ P via log (dQ/dP) ∼∑
i∈I λi log (dRi/dP). Since
∑
i∈I λi log (dRi/dQ) ∼ 0, one is allowed to formally write
(1.2) log dQ ∼
∑
i∈I
λi log dRi.
The fact that dRi/dQ ∈ L1(Q) implies log+ (dRi/dQ) ∈ L1(Q), and Jensen’s inequality gives
EQ [log (dRi/dQ)] ≤ 0, for all i ∈ I. Note that (1.2) implies that the existence of c ∈ R such that∑
i∈I λi log (dRi/dQ) = c holds; therefore, one actually has EQ [log (dRi/dQ)] ∈ (−∞, 0], for all
i ∈ I. In particular, log (dRi/dQ) ∈ L1(Q) holds for all i ∈ I, and
H(Q |Ri) = −EQ [log (dRi/dQ)] <∞, ∀i ∈ I.
1.5. Securities and valuation. Discrepancies amongst agents’ preferences provide incentive to
design securities, the trading of which could be mutually beneficial in terms of risk reduction.
In principle, the ability to design and trade securities in any desirable way essentially leads to a
complete market. In such a market, transactions amongst agents are characterised by a valuation
measure (that assigns prices to all imaginable securities), and a collection of the securities that will
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actually be traded. Since all future payoffs are measured under the same nume´raire, (no-arbitrage)
valuation corresponds to taking expectations with respect to probabilities in P. Given a valuation
measure, agents agree in a collection (Ci)i∈I ∈ (L0)I of zero-value securities, satisfying the market-
clearing condition
∑
i∈I Ci = 0. The security that agent i ∈ I takes a long position as part of the
transaction is Ci.
As mentioned in the introductory section, our model could find applications in OTC markets. For
instance, the design of asset-backed securities involves only a few number of financial institutions; in
this case, Pi stands for the subjective beliefs of each institution i ∈ I and, in view of the discussion
of §1.3, further incorporates any existing portfolios that back the security payoffs. In order to share
their risky positions, the institutions agree on prices of future random payoffs and on the securities
they are going to exchange. Other examples are the market of innovated credit derivatives or the
market of asset swaps that involve exchange of random payoff and a fixed payment.
1.6. Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. In the absence of any kind of strategic behaviour in designing
securities, the agreed-upon transaction amongst agents will actually form an Arrow-Debreu equi-
librium. The valuation measure will determine both trading and indifference prices, and securities
will be constructed in a way that maximise each agent’s respective utility.
Definition 1.1.
(
Q∗, (C∗i )i∈I
) ∈ P × (L0)I will be called an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium if:
(1)
∑
i∈I C
∗
i = 0, as well as C
∗
i ∈ L1(Q∗) and EQ∗ [C∗i ] = 0, for all i ∈ I, and
(2) for all C ∈ L1(Q∗) with EQ∗ [C] ≤ 0, Ui(C) ≤ Ui(C∗i ) holds for all i ∈ I.
Under risk preferences modelled by (1.1), a unique Arrow-Debreu equilibrium may be explicitly
obtained. In other guises, Theorem 1.2 that follows has appeared in many works—see for instance
[Bor62], [BJ79] and [Buh84]. Its proof is based on standard arguments; however, for reasons of
completeness, we provide a short argument in §A.1.
Theorem 1.2. In the above setting, there exists a unique Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
(
Q∗, (C∗i )i∈I
)
.
In fact, the valuation measure Q∗ ∈ P is such that
(1.3) log dQ∗ ∼
∑
i∈I
λi log dPi,
and the equilibrium market-clearing securities (C∗i )i∈I ∈ (L0)I are given by
(1.4) C∗i := δi log(dPi/dQ∗) + δiH(Q∗ |Pi), ∀i ∈ I,
where the fact that H(Q∗ |Pi) <∞ holds for all i ∈ I follows from §1.4.
The securities that agents obtain at Arrow-Debreu equilibrium described in (1.4) provide higher
payoff on events where their individual subjective probabilities are higher than the “geometric
mean” probability Q∗ of (1.3). In other words, discrepancies in beliefs result in allocations where
agents receive higher payoff on their corresponding relatively more likely events.
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Note also that the securities traded at Arrow-Debreu equilibrium have an interesting decompo-
sition. Since Ui(δi log(dPi/dQ∗)) = −δi logEPi [dQ∗/dPi] = 0 = Ui(0), agent i ∈ I is indifferent
between no trading and the first “random” part δi log(dPi/dQ∗) of the security C∗i . The second
“cash” part δiH(Q∗ |Pi) of C∗i is always nonnegative, and represents the monetary gain of agent
i ∈ I resulting from the Arrow-Debreu transaction. After this transaction, the position of agent
i ∈ I has certainty equivalent
(1.5) u∗i := Ui (C∗i ) = δiH(Q∗ |Pi), ∀i ∈ I.
The aggregate agents’ monetary value resulting from the Arrow-Debreu transaction equals
(1.6) u∗ :=
∑
i∈I
u∗i =
∑
i∈I
δiH(Q∗ |Pi).
Remark 1.3. In the setting and notation of §1.3, let (Ei)i∈I be the collection of agents’ random
endowments. Furthermore, suppose that agents share common subjective beliefs; for concreteness,
assume that P˜i = P, for all i ∈ I. In this case, and setting E :=
∑
i∈I Ei, the equilibrium valuation
measure of (1.3) satisfies log (dQ∗/dP) ∼ −E/δ and equilibrium securities of (1.4) are given by
C∗i = λiE − Ei − EQ∗ [λiE − Ei], for all i ∈ I. In particular, note the well-known fact that the
payoff of each shared security is a linear combination of the agents’ random endowments.
Remark 1.4. Since C∗i /δi ∼ − log(dQ∗/dPi), it is straightforward to compute
(1.7) Ui(Ci)− Ui(C∗i ) = −δi logEQ∗
[
exp
(
−Ci − C
∗
i
δi
)]
, ∀Ci ∈ L0, ∀i ∈ I.
In particular, an application of Jensen’s inequality gives Ui(Ci)−Ui(C∗i ) ≤ EQ∗ [Ci − C∗i ] = EQ∗ [Ci]
for Ci ∈ L1(Q∗), with equality if and only if Ci ∼ C∗i . The last inequality shows that C∗i is indeed
the optimally-designed security for agent i ∈ I under the valuation measure Q∗. Furthermore, for
any collection (Ci)i∈I with
∑
i∈I Ci = 0 and Ci ∈ L1(Q∗) for all i ∈ I, it follows that
∑
i∈I Ui(Ci) ≤∑
i∈I Ui(C∗i ) = u∗. A standard argument using the monotone convergence theorem extends the
previous inequality to∑
i∈I
Ui(Ci) ≤
∑
i∈I
Ui(C∗i ), ∀(Ci)i∈I ∈ (L0)I with
∑
i∈I
Ci = 0,
with equality if and only if Ci ∼ C∗i for all i ∈ I. Therefore, (C∗i )i∈I is a maximiser of the
functional
∑
i∈I Ui(Ci) over all (Ci)i∈I ∈ (L0)I with
∑
i∈I Ci = 0. In fact, the collection of all
such maximisers is (zi +C
∗
i )i∈I where (zi)i∈I ∈ RI is such that
∑
i∈I zi = 0. It can be shown that
all Pareto optimal securities are exactly of this form; see e.g., [JST08, Theorem 3.1] for a more
general result. Because of this Pareto optimality, the collection (Q∗, (C∗i )i∈I) usually comes under
the appellation of (welfare) optimal securities and valuation measure, respectively.
Of course, not every Pareto optimal allocation (zi+C
∗
i )i∈I , where (zi)i∈I is such that
∑
i∈I zi = 0,
is economically reasonable. A minimal “fairness” requirement that has to be imposed is that the
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position of each agent after the transaction is at least as good as the initial state. Since the utility
comes only in the terminal time, we obtain the requirement zi ≥ −u∗i , for all i ∈ I. While there
may be many choices satisfying the latter requirement in general, the choice zi = 0 of Theorem 1.2
has the cleanest economic interpretation in terms of complete financial market equilibrium.
Remark 1.5. If we ignore potential transaction costs, the cases where an agent has no motive to
enter in a risk-sharing transaction are extremely rare. Indeed, agent i ∈ I will not take part in
the Arrow-Debreu transaction if and only if Ci = 0, which happens when Pi = Q∗. In particular,
agents will already be in Arrow-Debreu equilibrium and no transaction will take place if and only
if they all share the same subjective beliefs.
2. Agents’ Best Probability Response
2.1. Strategic behaviour in risk sharing. In the Arrow-Debreu setting, the resulting equilib-
rium is based on the assumption that agents do not apply any kind of strategic behaviour. However,
in the majority of practical risk-sharing situations, the modelling assumption of absence of agents’
strategic behaviour is unreasonable, resulting, amongst other things, in overestimation of market
efficiency. When securities are negotiated among agents, their design and valuation will depend
not only on their existing risky portfolios, but also on the beliefs about the future outcomes they
will report for sharing. In general, agents will have incentive to report subjective beliefs that may
differ from their true views about future uncertainty; in fact, these will also depend on subjective
beliefs reported by the other parties.
As discussed in §1.6, for a given set of agents’ subjective beliefs, the optimal sharing rules
are governed by the mechanism resulting in Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, as these are the rules
that efficiently allocate discrepancies of risks and beliefs among agents. It is then reasonable to
assume that, in absence of a social planner, agents adapt this sharing mechanism for any collection
(Ri)i∈I ∈ PI of subjective probabilities they choose to report—see also the related discussion in the
introductory section). More precisely, in accordance to (1.3) and (1.4), the agreed-upon valuation
measure Q ∈ P is such that log dQ ∼ ∑i∈I λi log dRi, and the collection of securities that agents
will trade are Ci := δi log(dRi/dQ) + δiH(Q |Ri), i ∈ I.
Given the consistent with Arrow-Debreu equilibrium sharing rules, agents respond to subjective
beliefs that other agents have reported, with the goal to maximise their individual utility. In this
way, a game is formed, with the probability family P being the agents’ set of strategic choices.
The subject of the present Section 2 is to analyse the behaviour of individual agents, establish
their best response problem and show its well-posedness. The definition and analysis of the Nash
risk-sharing equilibrium is taken up in Section 3.
2.2. Best response. We shall now describe how agents respond to the reported subjective prob-
ability assessments from their counterparties. For the purposes of §2.2, we fix an agent i ∈ I and
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a collection of reported probabilities R−i := (Rj)j∈I\{i} ∈ PI\{i} of the remaining agents, and seek
the subjective probability that is going to be submitted by agent i ∈ I. According to the rules
described in §2.1, a reported probability Ri ∈ P from agent i ∈ I will lead to entering a long
position on the security with payoff
Ci := δi log
(
dRi/dQ(R−i,Ri)
)
+ δiH
(
Q(R−i,Ri) |Ri
)
,
where Q(R−i,Ri) ∈ P is such that
log dQ(R−i,Ri) ∼ λi log dRi +
∑
j∈I\{i}
λj log dRj .
By reporting subjective beliefs Ri ∈ P, agent i ∈ I also indirectly affects the geometric-mean
valuation probability Q(R−i,Ri), resulting in a highly non-linear overall effect in the security Ci.
With the above understanding, and given R−i := (Rj)j∈I\{i} ∈ PI\{i}, the response function of
agent i ∈ I is defined to be
P 3 Ri 7→ Vi(Ri;R−i) ≡ Ui
(
δi log
(
dRi/dQ(R−i,Ri)
)
+ δiH
(
Q(R−i,Ri) |Ri
))
= −δi logEPi
[
dQ(R−i,Ri)
dRi
]
+ δiH
(
Q(R−i,Ri) |Ri
)
,
where the fact that H (Q(R−i,Ri) |Ri) < ∞ follows from the discussion of §1.4. The problem of
agent i ∈ I is to report the subjective probability that maximises the certainty equivalent of the
resulting position after the transaction, i.e., to identify Rri ∈ P such that
(2.1) Vi(Rri;R−i) = sup
Ri∈P
Vi(Ri;R−i).
Any Rri ∈ P satisfying (2.1) shall be called best probability response.
In contrast to the majority of the related literature, the agent’s strategic set of choices in our
model may be of infinite dimension. This generalisation is important from a methodological view-
point; for example, in the setting of §1.3 it allows for random endowments with infinite support, like
ones with the Gaussian distribution or arbitrarily fat tails, a substantial feature in the modelling
of risk.
Remark 2.1. The best response problem (2.1) imposes no constrains on the shape of the agent’s
reported subjective probability, as long as it belongs to P. In principle, it is possible for agents to
report subjective views that are considerably far from their actual ones. Such severe departures
may be deemed unrealistic and are undesirable from a modelling point of view. However, as will
be argued in §3.3.2, extreme responses are endogenously excluded in our set-up.
We shall show in the sequel (Theorem 2.7) that best responses in (2.1) exist and are unique. We
start with a result which gives necessary and sufficient conditions for best probability response.
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Proposition 2.2. Fix i ∈ I and R−i ≡ (Rj)j∈I\{i} ∈ PI\{i}. Then, Rri ∈ P is best probability
response for agent i ∈ I given R−i if and only if the random variable Cri := δi log
(
dRri/dQ(R−i,R
r
i)
)
+
δiH
(
Q(R−i,Rri) |Rri
)
is such that Cri > −δ−i and
(2.2)
Cri
δi
+ λ−i log
(
1 +
Cri
δ−i
)
∼ −
∑
j∈I\{i}
λj log
(
dRj
dPi
)
.
The proof of Proposition 2.2 is given in §A.2. The necessity of the stated conditions for best
response follows from applying first-order optimality conditions. Establishing the sufficiency of the
stated conditions is certainly non-trivial, due to the fact that it is far from clear (and, in fact, not
known to us) whether the response function is concave.
Remark 2.3. In the context of Proposition 2.2, rewriting (2.2) we obtain that
(2.3)
Cri
δi
+ λ−i log
(
1 +
Cri
δ−i
)
∼ − log
(
dQ(R−i,Rri)
dPi
)
+ λi log
(
dRri
dPi
)
.
Using also the fact that Cri/δi ∼ log
(
dRri/dQ(R−i,R
r
i)
)
, it follows that
(2.4) log
(
dRri
dPi
)
∼ − log
(
1 +
Cri
δ−i
)
.
Hence, Rri = Pi holds if and only if log (1 + Cri/δ−i) ∼ 0, which holds if and only if Cri = 0.
(Note that Cri ∼ 0 implies Cri = 0, since the expectation of Cri under Q(R−i,R
r
i) equals zero.) In
words, the best probability response and actual subjective probabilities of an agent agree if and
only if the agent has no incentive to participate in the risk-sharing transaction, given the reported
subjective beliefs of other agents. Hence, in any non-trivial cases, agents’ strategic behaviour
implies a departure from reporting their true beliefs.
Plugging (2.4) back to (2.3), and using also (2.2), we obtain
(2.5) log
(
dQ(R−i,Rri)
dPi
)
∼ −C
r
i
δi
− log
(
1 +
Cri
δ−i
)
∼ −λi log
(
1 +
Cri
δ−i
)
+
∑
j∈I\{i}
λj log
(
dRj
dPi
)
,
providing directly the valuation measure Q(R−i,Rri) in terms of the security Cri .
Remark 2.4. A message from (2.4) is that, according to their best response process, agents will
report beliefs that understate (resp., overstate) the probability of their payoff being high (resp.,
low) relatively to their true beliefs. Such behaviour is clearly driven by a desired post-transaction
utility increase.
More importantly, and in sharp contrast to the securities (C∗i )i∈I formed in Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium, the security that agent i ∈ I wishes to enter, after taking into account the aggregate
reported beliefs of the rest and declaring subjective probability Rri, has limited liability, as it is
bounded from below by the constant −δ−i.
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Remark 2.5. Additional insight regarding best probability responses may be obtained resorting to
the discussion of §1.3, where Pi incorporates the random endowment Ei ∈ L0 of agent i ∈ I, in
the sense that log
(
dPi/dP˜i
) ∼ −Ei/δi, where P˜i denotes the subjective probability of agent i ∈ I.
It follows from (2.4) that log
(
dRri/dP˜i
) ∼ −Ei/δi − log (1 + Cri/δ−i). It then becomes apparent
that, when agents share their risky endowment, they tend to put more weight on the probability
of the downside of their risky exposure, rather than the upside. For an illustrative situation, see
Example 2.8 later on.
Remark 2.6. In the course of the proof of Proposition 2.2, the constant in the equivalence (2.2)
is explicitly computed; see (A.3). This constant has a particularly nice economic interpretation in
the case of two agents. To wit, let I = {0, 1}, and suppose that R1 ∈ P is given. Then, from the
vantage point of agent 0, (2.2) becomes
Cr0
δ0
+ λ1 log
(
1 +
Cr0
δ1
)
= ζ0 − λ1 log
(
dR1
dP0
)
,
where the constant ζ0 ∈ R is such that
ζ0 = − logEP0
[
exp
(
−C
r
0
δ0
)]
+ logER1
[
exp
(
Cr0
δ1
)]
=
U0(Cr0)
δ0
− U1(−C
r
0;R1)
δ1
.
where U1(·;R1) denotes the utility functional of a “fictitious” agent with representative pair (δ1,R1).
In words, ζ0 is the post-transaction difference, denominated in units of risk tolerance, of the utility
of agent 0 from the utility of agent 1 (who obtains the security −Cr0), provided that the latter
utility is measured with respect to the reported, as opposed to subjective, beliefs of agent 1. In
particular, when agent 1 does not behave strategically, in which case R1 = P1, it holds that
ζ0 = U0(Cr0)/δ0 − U1(−Cr0)/δ1.
Proposition 2.2 sets a roadmap for proving existence and uniqueness in the best response problem
via a one-dimensional parametrisation. Indeed, in accordance to (2.2), in order to find a best
response we consider for each zi ∈ R the unique random variable Ci(zi) that satisfies the equation
Ci(zi)/δi +λ−i log (1 + Ci(zi)/δ−i) = λ−izi−
∑
j∈I\{i} λj log (dRj/dPi); then, upon defining Qi(zi)
via log (dQi(zi)/dPi) ∼ −λi log (1 + Ci(zi)/δ−i) +
∑
j∈I\{i} λj log (dRj/dPi) in accordance to (2.5),
we seek ẑi ∈ R such that Ci(ẑi) ∈ L1(Qi(ẑi)) and EQi(ẑi) [Ci(ẑi)] = 0 hold. It turns out that there is
a unique such choice; once found, one simply defines Rri via log (dRri/dPi) ∼ − log (1 + Ci(ẑi)/δ−i),
in accordance to (2.4), to obtain the unique best response of agent i ∈ I given R−i. The technical
details of the proof of Theorem 2.7 below are given in §A.3.
Theorem 2.7. For i ∈ I and R−i ≡ (Rj)j∈I\{i} ∈ PI\{i}, there exists a unique Rri ∈ P such that
Vi(Rri;R−i) = supRi∈P Vi(Ri;R−i).
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2.3. The value of strategic behaviour. The increase on agents’ utility that is caused by fol-
lowing the best probability response procedure can be regarded as a measure for the value of the
strategic behaviour induced by problem (2.1). Consider for example the case where only a single
agent (say) 0 ∈ I applies the best probability response strategy and the rest of the agents report
their true beliefs, i.e., Rj = Pj holds for j ∈ I \ {0}. As mentioned in the introductory section, this
is a potential model of a transaction where only agent 0 possesses meaningful market power. Based
on the results of §2.2, we may calculate the gains, relative to the Arrow-Debreu transaction, that
agent 0 obtains by incorporating such strategic behaviour (which, among others, implies limited
liability of the security the agent takes a long position in). The main insights are illustrated in the
following two-agent example.
Example 2.8. Suppose that I = {0, 1} and δ0 = 1 = δ1. We shall use the set-up of §1.3, where for
simplicity it is assumed that agents have the same subjective probability measure. The agents are
exposed to random endowments E0 and E1 that (under the common probability measure) have
Gaussian law with mean zero and common variance σ2 > 0, while ρ ∈ [−1, 1] denotes the correlation
coefficient of E0 and E1. In this case, it is straightforward to check that C
∗
0 = (E1−E0)/2; therefore,
after the Arrow-Debreu transaction, the position of agent 0 is E0 + C
∗
0 = (E0 + E1)/2. On the
other hand, if agent 1 reports true beliefs, from (2.2) the security Cr0 corresponding to the best
probability response of agent 0 should satisfy 2Cr0 + log (1 + C
r
0) = ζ0 +E1 for appropriate ζ0 ∈ R
that is coupled with Cr0. For σ
2 = 1 and ρ = −0.5, straightforward Monte-Carlo simulation allows
the numerical approximation of the probability density functions (pdf) of E0 and E1 under the
best response probability Rr0, illustrated in Figure 1. As is apparent, the best probability response
drives agent 0 in overstating the downside risk of E0 and understating the downside risk of E1.
Figure 1. The solid black line is the pdf of endowments E0 and E1 under the agents’ common
subjective probability measure, while the other curves illustrate the pdf of E0 (dashed blue) and
E1 (dotted red) under the best probability response of agent 0. In this example, σ
2 = 1 and
ρ = −0.5.
16 MICHAIL ANTHROPELOS AND CONSTANTINOS KARDARAS
The effect of following such strategic behaviour is depicted in Figure 2, where there is comparison
between the probability density functions of the positions of agent 0 under (i) no trading; (ii) the
Arrow-Debreu transaction; and (iii) the transaction following the application of best response
strategic behaviour. As compared to the Arrow-Debreu position, the lower bound of the security
Cr0 guarantees a heavier right tail of the agent’s position after the best response transaction.
Figure 2. The solid black line is the pdf of the initial position E0, the dashed blue line illustrates
the pdf of the position E0 +C
∗
0 and the dotted red line is the pdf of the position E0 +C
r
0, all under
the common subjective probability measure. In this example, σ2 = 1 and ρ = −0.5.
3. Nash Risk-Sharing Equilibrium
We shall now consider the situation where every single agent follows the same strategic behaviour
indicated by the best response problem of Section 2. As previously mentioned, sharing securities
are designed following the sharing rules determined by Theorem 1.2 for any collection of reported
subjective views. With the well-posedness of the best response problem established, we are now
ready to examine whether the game among agents has an equilibrium point. In view of the analysis
of Section 2, individual agents have motive to declare subjective beliefs different than the actual
ones. (In particular, and in the setting of §1.3, agents will tend to overstate the probability of
their random endowments taking low values.) Each agent will act according to the best response
mechanism as in (2.1), given what other agents have reported as subjective beliefs. In a sense, the
best response mechanism indicates a negotiation scheme, the fixed point (if such exists) of which
will produce the Nash equilibrium valuation measure and risk-sharing securities.
Let us emphasise that the actual subjective beliefs of individual players are not necessarily
assumed to be private knowledge; rather, what is assumed here is that agents have agreed upon
the rules that associate any reported subjective beliefs to securities and prices, even if the reported
beliefs are not the actual ones. In fact, even if subjective beliefs constitute private knowledge
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initially, certain information about them will necessarily be revealed in the negotiation process
which will lead to Nash equilibrium.
There are two relevant points to consider here. Firstly, it is unreasonable for participants to
attempt to invalidate the negotiation process based on the claim that other parties do not report
their true beliefs, as the latter is, after all, a subjective matter. This particular point is reinforced
from the a posteriori fact that reported subjective beliefs in Nash equilibrium do not deviate far
from the true ones, as was pointed out in Remark 2.1 and is being further elaborated in §3.3.2.
Secondly, it is exactly the limited number of participants, rather than private or asymmetric
information, that gives rise to strategic behaviour: agents recognise their ability to influence the
market, since securities and valuation become output of collective reported beliefs. Even under the
appreciation that other agents will not report true beliefs and the negotiation will not produce an
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, agents will still want to reach a Nash equilibrium, as they will improve
their initial position. In fact, transactions with limited number of participants typically equilibrate
far from their competitive equivalents, as has been also highlighted in other models of thin financial
markets with symmetric information structure, like the ones in [CRW12] and [RW15]—see also the
related discussion in the introductory section.
3.1. Revealed subjective beliefs. Considering the model from a more pragmatic point of view,
one may argue that agents do not actually report subjective beliefs, but rather agree on a valuation
measure Q ∈ P and zero-price sharing securities (Ci)i∈I that clear the market. However, there is a
one-to-one correspondence between reporting subjective beliefs and proposing a valuation measure
and securities, as will be described below.
From the discussion of §2.1, a collection of subjective probabilities (Ri)i∈I gives rise to valuation
measure Q ∈ P such that log dQ ∼∑i∈I λi log dRi and collection (Ci)i∈I of securities is such that
Ci := δi log(dRi/dQ) + δiH(Q |Ri), for all i ∈ I. Of course,
∑
i∈I Ci = 0 and EQ [Ci] = 0 holds for
all i ∈ I. A further technical observation is that exp(Ci/δi) ∈ L1(Q) holds for all i ∈ I, which is
then a necessary condition that an arbitrary collection of market-clearing securities (Ci)i∈I must
satisfy with respect to an arbitrary valuation probability Q ∈ P in order to be consistent with
the aforementioned risk-sharing mechanism. The previous observations lead to a definition: for
Q ∈ P, we define the class CQ of securities that clear the market and are consistent with the
valuation measure Q via
CQ :=
{
(Ci)i∈I ∈ (L0)I
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈I
Ci = 0, and exp(Ci/δi) ∈ L1(Q), EQ [Ci] = 0, ∀i ∈ I
}
.
Note that all expectations of Ci under Q in the definition of CQ above are well defined. Indeed,
the fact that exp(Ci/δi) ∈ L1(Q) in the definition of CQ implies that (Ci)+ ∈ L1(Q) for all i ∈ I.
From
∑
i∈I Ci = 0, we obtain
∑
i∈I |Ci| = 2
∑
i∈I (Ci)+ and hence Ci ∈ L1(Q) for all i ∈ I.
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Starting from a given valuation measure Q ∈ P and securities (Ci)i∈I ∈ CQ, one may define
a collection (Ri)i∈I ∈ PI via log(dRi/dQ) ∼ Ci/δi for i ∈ I, and note that this is the unique
collection in PI that results in the valuation probability Q and securities (Ci)i∈I . In this way,
the probabilities (Ri)i∈I ∈ PI can be considered as revealed by the valuation measure Q ∈ P and
securities (Ci)i∈I ∈ CQ. Hence, agents proposing risk-sharing securities and a valuation measure
is equivalent to them reporting probability beliefs in the transaction. This viewpoint justifies and
underlies Definition 3.1 that follows: the objects of Nash equilibrium are the valuation measure
and designed securities, in consistency with the definition of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
3.2. Nash equilibrium and its characterisation. Following classic literature, we give the for-
mal definition of a Nash risk-sharing equilibrium.
Definition 3.1. The collection (Q, (Ci )i∈I) ∈ P × (L0)I will be called a Nash equilibrium if
(Ci )i∈I ∈ CQ and, with log(dRi /dQ) ∼ Ci /δi for all i ∈ I denoting the corresponding revealed
subjective beliefs, and R−i := (Rj )j∈I\{i} for i ∈ I, it holds that
Vi
(
Ri ;R−i
)
= sup
Ri∈P
Vi
(
Ri;R−i
)
, ∀i ∈ I.
A use of Proposition 2.2 results in the characterisation Theorem 3.2 below, the proof of which
is given in §A.4. For this, we need to introduce the n-dimensional Euclidean space
(3.1) ∆I =
{
z ∈ RI
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈I
zi = 0
}
.
Theorem 3.2. The collection (Q, (Ci )i∈I) ∈ P × (L0)I is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the
following three conditions hold:
(N1) Ci > −δ−i for all i ∈ I, and there exists z = (zi )i∈I ∈ ∆I such that
(3.2) Ci + δi log
(
1 +
Ci
δ−i
)
= zi + C
∗
i + δi
∑
j∈I
λj log
(
1 +
Cj
δ−j
)
, ∀i ∈ I;
(N2) with Q∗ ∈ P as in (1.3), i.e., such that log dQ∗ ∼∑i∈I λi log dPi, it holds that
(3.3) log
(
dQ
dQ∗
)
∼ −
∑
j∈I
λj log
(
1 +
Cj
δ−j
)
;
(N3) EQ [Ci ] = 0 holds for all i ∈ I.
Remark 3.3. Suppose that the agents’ preferences and risk exposures are such that no trade occurs
in Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, which happens when all Pi are the same (and equal to, say, P) for
all i ∈ I—see Remark 1.5. In this case, Q∗ = P and C∗i = 0 for all i ∈ I. It is then straightforward
from Theorem 3.2 to see that a Nash equilibrium is also given by Q = P and Ci = 0 (as well
as zi = 0) for all i ∈ I. In fact, as will be argued in §3.3.4, this is the unique Nash equilibrium
in this case. Conversely, suppose that a Nash equilibrium is given by Q = P and Ci = 0 for all
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i ∈ I. Then, (3.3) shows that Q∗ = Q = P and (3.2) implies that C∗i ∼ −zi ∼ 0, which means
that C∗i = 0 for all i ∈ I. In words, the Nash risk-sharing equilibrium involves no risk transfer if
and only if the agents are already in a Pareto optimal situation.
In the important case of two acting agents, since C0 = −C1 , applying simple algebra in (3.2), we
obtain that a Nash equilibrium risk sharing security C0 is such that −δ1 < C0 < δ0 and satisfies
(3.4) C0 +
δ0δ1
δ
log
(
1 + C0/δ1
1− C0/δ0
)
= z0 + C
∗
0 .
In Theorem 3.7, existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for the two-agent case will be shown.
Furthermore, a one-dimensional root-finding algorithm presented in §3.4 allows to calculate the
Nash equilibrium, and further calculate and compare the final position of each individual agent.
Consider for instance Example 2.8 and its symmetric situation that is illustrated in Figure 2, where
the limited liability of the security Cr0 implies less variability and flatter right tail of the agent’s
position. Under the Nash equilibrium, as will be argued in §3.3.1, security C0 is further bounded
from above, which implies that the probability density function of agent’s final position is shifted
to the left. This fact is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3. The solid green line is the pdf of the position E0+C0 , the dashed blue line illustrates
the pdf of the position E0 +C
∗
0 and the dotted red line is the pdf of the position E0 +C
r
0, all under
the common subjective probability measure. In this example, σ0 = σ1 = 1, and ρ = −0.5.
Despite the above symmetric case, it is not necessary true that all agents suffer a loss of utility at
the Nash equilibrium risk sharing. As we will see in the Section 4, for agents with sufficiently large
risk tolerance the negotiation game results in higher utility compared to the one gained through
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
3.3. Within equilibrium. According to Theorem 3.7, Nash equilibria in the sense of Definition
3.1 always exist. Throughout §3.3, we assume that (Q, (Ci )i∈I) is a Nash equilibrium and provide
a discussion on certain aspects of it, based on the characterisation Theorem 3.2.
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3.3.1. Endogenous bounds on traded securities. As was pointed in Remark 2.4, the security that
each agent enters resulting from the best response procedure is bounded below. When all par-
ticipating agents follow the same strategic behaviour, Nash equilibrium securities are bounded
from above as well. Indeed, since the market clears, the security that agents take a long position
into is shorted by the rest of the agents, who similarly intend to bound their liabilities. Math-
ematically, since Ci > −δ−i is valid for all i ∈ I and
∑
i∈I C

i = 0 holds, it also follows that
Ci = −
∑
j∈I\{i}C

j <
∑
j∈I\{i} δ−j = (n − 1)δ + δi, for all i ∈ I. Therefore, a consequence
of the agents’ strategic behaviour is that Nash risk-sharing securities are endogenously bounded.
This fact is in sharp contrast with the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of (1.4), where the risk transfer
may involve securities with unbounded payoffs. An immediate consequence of the bounds on the
securities is that the potential gain from the Nash risk-sharing transaction is also endogenously
bounded. Naturally, the resulting endogenous bounds are an indication of how the game among
agents restricts the risk-sharing transaction, which in turn may be a source of large loss of efficiency.
The next example is an illustration of the such inefficiency in a simple symmetric setting. Later
on, in Figure 3, the loss of utility in another two-agent example is visualised.
Example 3.4. Let X ∈ L0 have the standard (zero mean, unit standard deviation) Gaussian law
under the baseline probability P. For β ∈ R, define Pβ ∈ P via log (dPβ/dP) ∼ βX; under Pβ,
X has the Gaussian law with mean β and unit standard deviation. Fix β > 0, and set P0 := Pβ
and P1 := P−β. In this case, it is straightforward to compute that C∗0 = βX = −C∗1 . It also
follows that u∗0 = β2/2 = u∗1. If β is large, the discrepancy between the agents’ beliefs results in
large monetary profits to both after the Arrow-Debreu transaction. On the other hand, as will be
established in Theorem 3.7, in case of two agents there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. In fact,
in this symmetric case we have that −1 < C0 < 1, and it can be checked that (see also (3.4) later)
C0 +
1
2
log
(
1 + C0
1− C0
)
= βX.
The loss of efficiency caused by the game becomes greater with increasing values of β > 0. In
fact, if β converges to infinity, it can be shown that C0 converges to sign(X) = I{X>0} − I{X<0};
furthermore, both U0 (C0 ) and U1 (C1 ) will converge to 1, which demonstrates the tremendous
inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium transaction as compared to the Arrow-Debreu one.
Note that the endogenous bounds −δ−i < Ci < (n− 1)δ + δi depend only on the risk tolerance
profile of the agents, and not on their actual beliefs (or risk exposures). In addition, these bounds
become stricter in games where quite risk-averse agents are playing, as they become increasingly
hesitant towards undertaking risk.
3.3.2. If trading, you never reveal your true beliefs. As discussed in Remark 2.3, agents’ best prob-
ability response differ from their actual subjective beliefs in any situation where risk transfer is
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involved. This result becomes more pronounced when we consider the Nash risk-sharing equilib-
rium. To wit, if (Ri )i∈I are revealed subjective beliefs corresponding to a Nash equilibrium, it is
as a consequence of Theorem 3.2 (see also (2.4)) that
(3.5) log
(
dRi
dPi
)
∼ − log
(
1 +
Ci
δ−i
)
, ∀i ∈ I.
Note that Ri = Pi holds if and only if Ci = 0 for any fixed i ∈ I; therefore, whenever agents take
part (by actually trading) in Nash equilibrium, their reported subjective beliefs are never the same
as their actual ones.
Even though in any non-trivial trading situation agents will report different subjective beliefs
from their actual ones, we shall argue below that (3.5) imposes endogenous constraints on the
magnitude of the possible discrepancy; the discussion the follows expands on Remark 2.1. Start
by writing (3.5) as log (dPi/dRi ) = −κi + log (1 + Ci /δ−i), where κi := logERi [1 + Ci /δ−i], and
note that ERi [C

i ] ≥ −δi logERi [exp (−Ci /δi)] ≥ 0 holds, where we have used Jensen’s inequality
and the fact that (Q, (Ci )i∈I) is an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium for the fictitious agents’ preference
pairs (δi,Ri )i∈I . It follows that κi ≥ 0 holds, which implies that dPi/dRi ≤ 1 + Ci /δ−i, for all
i ∈ I. Defining weights (αi)i∈I via αi := δ−i/nδ = λ−i/n for all i ∈ I (noting that 0 < αi < 1/n
holds for all i ∈ I, and that ∑i∈I αi = 1), a use of the market-clearing condition ∑i∈I Ci = 0
gives
∑
i∈I αi (dPi/dRi ) ≤ 1. One can obtain a corresponding lower bound. Indeed, using the
endogenous bounds Ci ≤ (n − 1)δ + δi, it follows that κi ≤ − logαi for all i ∈ I, which gives
dPi/dRi ≥ αi(1+Ci /δ−i) = αi+Ci /(nδ). Using again the market-clearing condition
∑
i∈I C

i = 0,
it follows that
∑
i∈I (dPi/dRi ) ≥ 1. To recapitulate,∑
i∈I
αi
dPi
dRi
≤ 1 ≤
∑
i∈I
dPi
dRi
holds, which imposes considerable a-priori restrictions on the likelihood ratios dPi/dRi for all i ∈ I.
(For example, there are no events for which all agents will overstate or understate their likelihood
as compared to their actual subjective beliefs.) In particular, since 1/αi = n/λ−i, we obtain that
(3.6)
dPi
dRi
≤ n
λ−i
, ∀i ∈ I.
The above upper bound on the likelihood of Pi with respect to Ri only depends on the number
of remaining agents n and the relative risk tolerance coefficient of the agents; it does not depend
neither the aggregate risk tolerance level δ nor the actual subjective beliefs of other agents. Fur-
thermore, note also that bound (3.6) implies that H(Pi |Ri ) = EPi [log(dPi/dRi )] ≤ log(n/λ−i).
The latter gives an a-priori endogenous estimate on the distance of the truth from the reported
beliefs in Nash equilibrium.
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3.3.3. Loss of efficiency. As already mentioned, agents’ strategic behaviour results in risk-sharing
inefficiency, which, since utilities (Ui)i∈I are numerically represented by certainty equivalents,
can be measured through the difference of the aggregate monetary utility under the Arrow-Debreu
transaction and the aggregate monetary utility under the Nash equilibrium risk-sharing transaction.
Note that similar measures of inefficiency have been used in risk-sharing literature—see e.g., [Vay99]
or [AB05]. Mathematically, the loss of efficiency equals u∗−u = ∑i∈I u∗i −∑i∈I ui , where (u∗i )i∈I
and u∗ are defined in (1.5) and (1.6), while
ui := Ui (Ci ) , ∀i ∈ I, and u :=
∑
i∈I
ui .
From (1.7), (3.2) and (3.3), it follows that
ui − u∗i = −δi logEQ∗
[
exp
(
−C

i − C∗i
δi
)]
= zi − δi logEQ∗
(1 + Ci
δ−i
)∏
j∈I
(
1 +
Cj
δ−j
)−λj
= zi − δi logEQ
[
1 +
Ci
δ−i
]
− δi logEQ∗
∏
j∈I
(
1 +
Cj
δ−j
)−λj , ∀i ∈ I.
Recalling that EQ [Ci ] = 0 holds for all i ∈ I, and noting the equality
EQ∗
∏
j∈I
(
1 +
Cj
δ−j
)−λj = EQ
∏
j∈I
(
1 +
Cj
δ−j
)λj−1
which holds in view of (3.3), we obtain
(3.7) ui − u∗i = zi + λiδ logEQ
∏
j∈I
(
1 +
Cj
δ−j
)λj , ∀i ∈ I.
Adding up (3.7) over all i ∈ I and using the fact that ∑i∈I zi = 0, one obtains an analytic
expression of the loss of efficiency caused by the game:
(3.8) u − u∗ = δ logEQ
[∏
i∈I
(
1 +
Ci
δ−i
)λi]
.
Since
∏
i∈I (1 + C

i /δ−i)
λi ≤ ∑i∈I λi (1 + Ci /δ−i) = 1 + ∑i∈I λiCi /δ−i and from the fact that
EQ [Ci ] = 0 holds for all i ∈ I, we indeed have u ≤ u∗ (which was anyway known from Remark
1.4); furthermore, the equality u = u∗ happens if and only if Ci = 0 holds for all i ∈ I, which
happens if and only if C∗i = 0 holds for all i ∈ I—see Remark 3.3. In other words, the Nash
risk-sharing equilibrium always implies a strict loss of efficiency, except for the case where there
is no trading within Nash equilibrium (which is equivalent to the case where there is no trading
within Arrow-Debreu equilibrium as well).
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3.3.4. A priori information on z. From (3.7) and (3.8), one obtains
(3.9) ui − u∗i = zi + λi (u − u∗) , ∀i ∈ I.
The above equality implies an economic interpretation for zi = λi (u
∗ − u) + (ui − u∗i ). Indeed,
λi (u
∗ − u) is the fraction, corresponding to agent i ∈ I, of the aggregate loss of utility caused by
forming a Nash, instead of Arrow-Debreu, equilibrium; on the other hand, ui −u∗i is the difference
between the utility that agent i ∈ I acquires in Nash equilibrium from the Arrow-Debreu one.
Although the aggregate utility u in Nash equilibrium risk sharing can never be higher than the
Arrow-Debreu aggregate utility u∗, it may happen that some agents benefit from the game, in the
sense that their individual utility after the negotiation game is higher when compared to the utility
gain of the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. We will address such cases in Section 4.
Equation (3.9) is useful in obtaining tight bounds on z = (zi )i∈I . Using the facts that u

i ≥ 0
for all i ∈ I, u ≤ u∗, and the equality zi = λi (u∗ − u) + ui − u∗i , it follows that
(3.10) zi ≥ −u∗i , ∀i ∈ I.
Combined with
∑
i∈I z

i = 0, the previous a priori bounds imply that z
 has to live in a compact
simplex on ∆I . The bounds in (3.10) are indeed sharp: in the no-trade setting of Remark 3.3, it
follows that u∗i = 0 for all i ∈ I, which implies that zi ≥ 0 should hold for all i ∈ I; since z ∈ ∆I ,
it follows that zi = 0 should hold for all i ∈ I. This also shows that the trivial Nash equilibrium
obtained in Remark 3.3 is unique.
3.3.5. Individual marginal indifference valuation. In view of (3.8) and the subsequent discussion,
and recalling Remark 1.4, it follows that the allocation in Nash equilibrium fails to be Pareto
optimal (except in the trivial no-trade case). Another way to demonstrate the inefficiency of
Nash equilibrium is through the disagreement between the individual agent’s marginal (utility)
indifference valuation measures after the Nash risk-sharing transaction.
Recall that, given a position Gi ∈ L0 with Ui(Gi) > −∞, the marginal indifference val-
uation measure Qi = Qi(Gi) of agent i ∈ I has the property that the function R 3 q 7→
Ui (Gi + q(X − EQi [X])) is maximised at q = 0 for all X ∈ L∞; in other words, if prices are
given by expectations under Qi, agent i ∈ I has no incentive to take any position other than Gi.
Using first-order conditions, it is straightforward to show that log (dQi/dPi) ∼ −Gi/δi holds.
In Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, the collection (Q∗i )i∈I with log (dQ
∗
i /dPi) ∼ −C∗i /δi for i ∈ I,
which are the individual marginal indifference valuation measures associated with positions (C∗i )i∈I
after the Arrow-Debreu risk-sharing transaction, satisfies Q∗i = Q∗ for all i ∈ I: all agents’ marginal
indifference valuation measures agree. Now, denote the individual agent’s marginal indifference
valuation measures after the Nash risk-sharing transaction by (Qi )i∈I , for which log (dQ

i /dPi) ∼
−Ci /δi holds for all i ∈ I. In view of log (dPi/dQ∗) ∼ C∗i /δi, (3.2) and (3.3), it follows that
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log (dQi /dQ) ∼ log (1 + Ci /δ−i). Since EQ [1 + Ci /δ−i] = 1, it actually follows that
(3.11)
dQi
dQ
= 1 +
Ci
δ−i
, ∀i ∈ I.
Pareto optimality would require all (Qi )i∈I to agree, which is possible only if C

i = 0, for all i ∈ I,
i.e., exactly when no trade occurs.
All Nash securities (Ci )i∈I have zero value under Q. For each individual agent i ∈ I, we can
measure the marginal indifference value of Ci via
(3.12) EQi [C

i ] = EQ
[(
1 +
Ci
δ−i
)
Ci
]
=
1
δ−i
VarQ (Ci ) , ∀i ∈ I.
In particular, note that EQi [C

i ] ≥ 0, with strict inequality if Ci is non-zero, for all i ∈ I. This
observation implies that (except in trivial situations of no trading) all agents would be better
off if they would take a larger position in their individual securities; for all a ∈ R+ the collection
(aCi )i∈I of securities clears the market, and for some a > 1 this collection of securities would result
in higher utility for each agent than using securities (Ci )i∈I . Of course, what prevents agents from
doing so is that they would find themselves in (Nash) disequilibrium. The fact that agents will
not agree on market-clearing collections (aCi )i∈I which for some a > 1 would be individually (and
therefore, also collectively) preferable also indicates that trading volume within Nash equilibrium
tends to be reduced.
The individual marginal indifference valuation measures (Qi )i ∈ I allow for an interesting ex-
pression of the Nash valuation measure Q. To wit, recall from §3.3.2 the weights αi = δ−i/nδ for
all i ∈ I; then, from (3.11) and the market clearing condition ∑i∈I Ci = 0, it follows that
(3.13) Q =
∑
i∈I
αiQi .
In words, the Nash valuation measure Q is a convex combination of the individual agent’s marginal
indifference valuation measures, assigning weight αi to agent i ∈ I. Note also that more risk-averse
agents carry more weight; however, since maxi∈I αi < 1/n, Q is almost equal to the equally-
weighted average of (Qi )i∈I for large numbers of agents.
Relation (3.13) highlights the importance of risk tolerance levels regarding the gain or loss
of utility for individual agents in Nash equilibrium. Consider for instance the situation of two
interacting agents, with one of them being considerably more risk tolerant than the other. In this
case, Q will be very close to the risk-averse agent’s marginal utility-based valuation measure, who
will agree with the quoted prices. On the other hand, the possible discrepancy of Q from the
risk tolerant agent’s marginal utility-based valuation is beneficial to this agent, as it allows for the
opportunity to purchase a positive-value security for zero price. A limiting instructive scenario
along these lines is treated in Section 4.
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The marginal indifference valuation measures (Qi )i∈I of (3.11) can be used to provide interesting
formulas for the utility gain in Nash equilibrium and the utility difference between the Nash and
Arrow-Debreu transactions. Note first that (3.3) and (3.8) give
log
(
dQ∗
dQ
)
=
∑
j∈I
λj log
(
1 +
Cj
δ−j
)
+
u∗ − u
δ
,
which combined with (3.9) and the fact that C∗i = δi log (dPi/dQ∗) + u∗i implies that
(3.14) Ci + δi log
(
1 +
Ci
δ−i
)
= zi + C
∗
i + δi
∑
j∈I
λj log
(
1 +
Cj
δ−j
)
= ui + δi log
(
dPi
dQ
)
.
Using further (3.11) and taking expectation with respect to Q in (3.14), we obtain
ui = δiH(Q |Pi)− δiH(Q |Qi ), i ∈ I.
The last equality has to be compared with (1.5). As in Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, agents in Nash
equilibrium benefit from the distance of the resulting valuation measure from their subjective views;
however, unlike the Pareto-optimal efficiency of the Arrow-Debreu transaction, agents in the Nash
transaction suffer loss from the distance of the valuation measure from their respective marginal
indifference valuation measures.
From (3.14) and (3.11) it follows that Ci = −δi log (dQi /dPi) + Ui(Ci); combining this with
C∗i = δi log (dPi/dQ∗) +u∗i , we obtain Ci + δi log (dQi /dQ∗) = C∗i + (ui −u∗i ), for all i ∈ I. Taking
expectations with respect to Q∗, it follows that
(3.15) ui − u∗i = EQ∗ [Ci ]− δiH(Q∗ |Qi ), ∀i ∈ I.
The difference of individual agents’ utilities in the two equilibria comes from two distinct sources.
The first stems from the discrepancy (measured via the relative entropy) of the Arrow-Debreu
valuation from the individual marginal indifference valuation of agent i ∈ I in Nash equilibrium.
When the agents’ marginal indifference valuation measure in Nash equilibrium is close to the
Arrow-Debreu measure, his loss of utility caused by the Nash game is lower. In a sense, this is
the part of aggregate loss of utility that is “paid” by agent i ∈ I (see also (3.16) below). The
other term on the right-hand-side of (3.15) regards the price under the Arrow-Debreu valuation
measure Q∗ of the actual security that agent i ∈ I buys at Nash equilibrium. Recalling that Nash
equilibrium prices of the Nash securities (Ci )i∈I are zero, positivity of EQ∗ [Ci ] implies that the
security Ci is undervalued in Nash equilibrium transaction. Again, note that if Qi is close to Q∗,
the valuation EQ∗ [Ci ] tends to be positive, since EQi [C

i ] is always nonnegative (see (3.12)). To
recapitulate the previous discussion: agents whose marginal indifference valuation measure is close
to the Arrow-Debreu one tend to benefit from the Nash game. As we will see in Section 4, this
happens, for example, when agent i ∈ I is sufficiently risk tolerant.
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Due to the market-clearing condition
∑
i∈I C

i = 0, the aggregate loss takes into account only
the aggregate discrepancy of individual marginal measures from the Arrow-Debreu optimal one:
under-valuation of certain securities balances off by over-valuation of others. Indeed, adding up
(3.15) over all i ∈ I, gives
(3.16) u∗ − u =
∑
i∈I
δiH(Q∗ |Qi ),
which measures Nash inefficiency as aggregate discrepancy from optimal valuation of the individual
agents’ marginal indifference valuation in Nash equilibrium. Equation 3.16 is the counterpart of
(1.6), where the inefficiency of complete absence of trading as compared to Arrow-Debreu risk-
sharing is considered.
3.4. Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium via finite-dimensional root finding.
Theorem 3.2 is used as a guide in order to search for equilibrium, parametrising candidates for
optimal securities using the n-dimensional space ∆I introduced in (3.1). Proposition 3.5 that
follows, and whose proof is the content of §A.5, enables to reduce the search of Nash equilibrium,
an inherently infinite-dimensional problem in our setting, to a finite-dimensional one. The latter
problem gives the necessary tools for numerical approximations of Nash equilibria (see also Example
3.8 below).
Proposition 3.5. For all z ∈ ∆I there exists unique (Ci(z))i∈I ∈ (L0)I with Ci(z) > −δ−i and
(3.17) Ci(z) + δi log
(
1 +
Ci(z)
δ−i
)
= zi + C
∗
i + δi
∑
j∈I
λj log
(
1 +
Cj(z)
δ−j
)
, ∀i ∈ I.
(Note that, necessarily,
∑
i∈I Ci(z) = 0 for all z ∈ ∆I .) Furthermore, it holds that
(3.18) EQ∗
∏
j∈I
(
1 +
Cj(z)
δ−j
)−λj <∞.
In the notation of Proposition 3.5, for each z ∈ ∆I , define the probability Q(z) via
(3.19) log
(
dQ(z)
dQ∗
)
∼ −
∑
j∈I
λj log
(
1 +
Cj(z)
δ−j
)
.
The uniform bounds −δ−i < Ci(z) < (n − 1)δ + δi follow exactly as in §3.3.1, and imply that
exp(Ci(z)/δi) ∈ L1(Q(z)) holds for all i ∈ I and z ∈ ∆I . In particular, (Ci(z))i∈I ∈ CQ(z) holds
for all z ∈ ∆I . In view of Theorem 3.2, Nash equilibria amount to finding z ∈ ∆I such that
EQ(z) [Ci(z)] = 0 holds for all i ∈ I. We can in fact define a function ` : ∆I 7→ R+ that gives a
“distance from equilibrium” via the formula
(3.20) `(z) = −
∑
i∈I
δ−i log
(
1 +
EQ(z) [Ci(z)]
δ−i
)
, ∀z ∈ ∆I .
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Since Ci(z) > −δ−i holds for all z ∈ ∆I , ` is well defined. Furthermore, the inequality log(x) ≤ x−1,
valid for all x ∈ (0,∞), gives
`(z) ≥ −
∑
i∈I
δ−i
(EQ(z) [Ci(z)]
δ−i
)
= −EQ(z)
[∑
i∈I
Ci(z)
]
= 0, ∀z ∈ ∆I ,
in view of the fact that
∑
i∈I Ci(z) = 0 for all z ∈ ∆I , which shows that ` is indeed R+-valued.
Furthermore, since log(x) < x − 1 holds for all x ∈ (0,∞) \ {1}, for any z ∈ ∆I it follows that
`(z) = 0 is equivalent to EQ(z) [Ci(z)] = 0 for all i ∈ I.
The following result summarises the above discussion.
Proposition 3.6. With the previous notation, the following are true:
• Assume that (Q, (Ci )i∈I) is a Nash equilibrium, and let z ≡ (zi )i∈I ∈ ∆I be as in (3.2).
Then, ` (z) = 0.
• Assume the existence of z ∈ ∆I such that ` (z) = 0. Then, (Q(z), (Ci(z))i∈I) as defined
in (3.17) and (3.19) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.6 provides a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria and roots of `.
Recalling the discussion in §3.3.4, any root of ` belongs to the compact subset of ∆I consisting of
(zi)i∈I ∈ ∆I with zi ≥ −u∗i for all i ∈ I. This fact allows for numerical approximations of Nash
equilibria via, for example, Monte-Carlo simulation.
Its practical usefulness notwithstanding, Proposition 3.6 does not answer the question of actual
existence of Nash equilibria and, in case of existence, the uniqueness. Such issues are settled in
Theorem 3.7 that follows, the proof of which is the subject of §A.6.
Theorem 3.7. A Nash risk-sharing equilibrium always exists. When, additionally, I = {0, 1},
Nash risk-sharing equilibrium is necessarily unique.
The question of uniqueness for three or more agents remains open, and is significantly more chal-
lenging from a mathematical perspective. In all cases of numerical simulation that were carried out,
we observed (existence and) uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. The next example is representative.
Example 3.8. Consider a three-agent game with δ0 = δ1 = δ2 = 1. We assume that log (dPi/dP) ∼
Xi holds for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, where (X0, X1, X2) under baseline probability P has a mean-zero normal
distribution with σ(X0) = 0.4, σ(X1) = 2.7, σ(X2) = 1.1, ρ(X0, X1) = −0.9, ρ(X0, X2) = 0.7
and ρ(X1, X2) = −0.3. In Figure 4, we plot the function ` for different values of (z1, z2), only in
the bounded region specified by the inequalities z1 ≥ −u∗1, z2 ≥ −u∗2, and z1 + z2 ≤ u∗0, where
recall that z1 + z2 = −z0. As can be seen, there is a unique root of ` approximately at the vector
z = (z0 , z1 , z2) = (0.14,−0.7, 0.56).
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Figure 4. The function ` for different values of z, corresponding to Example 3.8.
4. Extreme Risk Tolerance
As discussed in §3.3.5, risk-tolerance coefficients are crucial factors in the gain or the loss caused
by the game in each agent’s utility. In this section, we investigate this issue closer by studying
and comparing the Arrow-Debreu and Nash risk-sharing equilibria when agents’ risk preferences
approach risk neutrality, in the sense that risk tolerance approaches infinity. In order to focus on
the economic interpretation of the results, we consider the simplified (but representative) case of
two agents.
The analysis that follows examines two cases: firstly, when only one agent becomes extremely risk
tolerant and, secondly, when both agents’ risk tolerance coefficients uniformly approach infinity.
Besides the interest of this analysis in its own right, it also allows us to substantiate the claim that
highly risk tolerant agents are the ones actually benefit from the risk-sharing game.
4.1. One extremely risk tolerant agent. We start with the two-agent case I = {0, 1}, wherein
the risk aversion of only one agent approaches zero. We keep the risk tolerance δ1 and subjec-
tive probability P1 of agent 1 fixed. On the other hand, for agent 0 we consider a sequence of
risk tolerance coefficients (δm0 )m∈N with the property that limm→∞ δ
m
0 = ∞ and a fixed subjec-
tive probability P0. In this set-up, Theorem 1.2 and Theorem 3.7 state that for each m ∈ N
there exist a unique Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
(
Qm,∗, (Cm,∗i )i∈I
)
and a unique Nash equilibrium(
Qm,, (Cm,i )i∈I
)
. We use agent 0 as the baseline and focus on the securities Cm,∗0 and C
m,
0 , since
Cm,∗1 = −Cm,∗0 and Cm,1 = −Cm,0 .
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We first examine the limiting behaviour of the valuation rule and the securities in the Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium transaction. For each m ∈ N, from (1.3) we obtain that Qm,∗ ∈ P is such that
log (dQm,∗/dP0) ∼ λm1 log (dP1/dP0). More precisely, we have
(4.1)
dQm,∗
dP0
= EP0
[(
dP1
dP0
)λm1 ]−1(dP1
dP0
)λm1
.
Given that limm→∞ λm1 = 0, L0- limm→∞ (dQm,∗/dP0) = 1 readily follows from the dominated
convergence theorem—in fact, with |·|TV denoting total variation norm, Scheffe’s lemma implies
that limm→∞ |Qm,∗ − P0|TV = 0. Since, Cm,∗0 = −Cm,∗1 = δ1 log (dQm,∗/dP1) − δ1H(Qm,∗ |P1)
holds for all m ∈ N and (Qm,∗)m∈N converges to P0, one expects that L0- limm→∞Cm,∗0 =
δ1 log(dP0/dP1)− δ1H(P0 |P1). Clearly, for the previous limit to be valid the following (technical)
assumption is necessary.
Assumption 4.1. H(P0 |P1) <∞.
In §A.7, it is shown that the latter assumption is also sufficient for the validity of Proposition
4.2 below, giving the limiting valuation and security in Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, as well as the
limiting gain of both agents.
Proposition 4.2. Under the force of Assumption 4.1, it holds that C∞,∗0 := L0- limm→∞C
m,∗
0 =
δ1 log(dP0/dP1)− δ1H(P0 |P1), limm→∞ um,∗0 = 0 and limm→∞ um,∗1 = δ1H(P0 |P1).
It is indeed expected that the utility gain of a nearly risk neutral agent is almost zero. To see
this, compare the limiting valuation measure, which is P0, with the limiting utility of agent 0,
which is linear expectation with respect to P0. On the other hand, the only case where there is no
limiting utility gain for agent 1 is when the two agents’ subjective beliefs coincide.
We now turn to Nash risk-sharing equilibrium. From (3.4), we obtain
Cm,0 + δ1λ
m
0 log
(
1 + Cm,0 /δ1
1− Cm,0 /δm0
)
= zm,0 + C
m,∗
0 , ∀m ∈ N.
Accepting that the sequence
(
zm,0
)
m∈N converges in R and
(
Cm,0
)
m∈N converges in L
0 (these
conjectures actually have to be proved as part of Theorem 4.4 below), and given that limm→∞ δm0 =
∞, limm→∞ λm0 = 1, and L0- limm→∞Cm,∗0 = C∞,∗0 , the limiting security C∞,0 := L0- limm→∞Cm,0
should satisfy C∞,0 + δ1 log
(
1 + Cm,0 /δ1
)
= z∞,0 + C
∞,∗
0 , where z
∞,
0 := limm→∞ z
m,
0 . This
heuristic discussion gives a method to compute the limit. For any z ∈ R, define the random
variable C∞0 (z) satisfying the equation
(4.2) C∞0 (z) + δ1 log
(
1 +
C∞0 (z)
δ1
)
= z + C∞,∗0 .
Since the function (−1,∞) 3 x 7→ x + log (1 + x) is strictly increasing and continuous and maps
(−1,∞) to (−∞,∞), it follows that C∞0 (z) is a well defined (−δ1,∞)-valued random variable
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for all z ∈ R. Then, we should have C∞,0 = C∞0 (z∞,0 ). Although z∞,0 is given as the limit of(
zm,0
)
m∈N, we may actually identify a priori what its value will be. To make headway, note that
from (3.3)
log (dQm,/dQm,∗) ∼ −λm0 log(1 + Cm,0 /δ1)− λm1 log(1− Cm,0 /δm0 ), ∀m ∈ N,
and the fact that limm→∞ |Qm,∗ − P0|TV = 0, the limiting Nash valuation probability Q∞, should
be such that log (dQ∞,/dP0) ∼ − log(1 +C∞,0 /δ1); since EQ∞,
[
C∞,0
]
= 0 is expected to hold at
the limit, we obtain actually that EP0
[ (
1 + C∞,0 /δ1
)−1 ]
= 1 would have to be satisfied. The next
result, the proof of which is given in §A.8, ensures that a unique such candidate z∞,0 ∈ R exists.
Lemma 4.3. In the notation of (4.2), there exists a unique z∞,0 ∈ R satisfying the equality
EP0
[ (
1 + C∞0 (z
∞,
0 )/δ1
)−1 ]
= 1.
Before we state our main result on the limiting behaviour of Nash equilibrium, we make a final
observation. Recall from (3.5) that log
(
dRm,1 /dP1
) ∼ − log (1− Cm,0 /δm0 ) holds for all m ∈ N.
Since limm→∞ δm0 = ∞ and, as it turns out,
(
Cm,0
)
m∈N is convergent, the revealed subjective
probability Rm,1 of agent 1 when m is large is very close to the actual P1. (There is an alternative
way to obtain the same intuition. From (3.6), note that dRm,1 /dP1 ≥ λm0 holds for all m ∈ N.
Since limm→∞ λm0 = 1 and (dR
m,
1 /dP1)m∈N has constant unit expectation under P1,
(
Rm,1
)
m∈N
has to converge to P1.) This suggests the same asymptotic behaviour in the case discussed in §2.3,
where only agent 0 acts strategically as indicated by the best probability response, while agent 1
reports true subjective beliefs P1. Indeed, the following result, whose proof is given in §A.9, implies
that the limiting security structure is the same, regardless of whether the risk-averse agent 1 enters
in the game or simply reports true subjective beliefs (in which case, only the approximately risk
neutral agent behaves strategically).
Theorem 4.4. With the previous notation (in particular, of Lemma 4.3), it holds that
C∞,0 := L
0- lim
m→∞C
m,
0 = C
∞
0 (z
∞,
0 ) = L
0- lim
m→∞C
m,r
0 .
The equality of the limits of
(
Cm,0
)
m∈N and
(
Cm,r0
)
m∈N implies that the strategic behaviour
of a risk neutral agent dominates the risk sharing transaction. Intuitively, agents with high risk
tolerance are willing to undertake more risk at the sharing transaction in return of a higher cash
compensation. Thus, at the limit, the risk neutral agent satisfies the reported hedging needs of
other agents, but achieves better prices by applying the best response strategy. On the other hand,
for the risk averse agent the risk reduction is more important than a higher price to be paid. As
a result, at the equilibrium the risk averse agent prefers to submit true beliefs, even though this
results in a higher price to be paid to the risk neutral agent. The situation is totally different in an
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium transaction, where agents act basically as price takers and the securities
and prices are determined by the efficiency of the transaction.
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We argued in Subsection 3.3 that in any risk-transfer situation the Nash equilibrium incurs some
loss of efficiency. Although the aggregate utility is reduced in Nash equilibrium when compared
with the Arrow-Debreu one, certain agents may obtain higher utility gain in risk-sharing games.
In particular, Proposition 4.5 below (the proof of which is given in §A.10) demonstrates that the
agent with sufficiently high risk tolerance enjoys higher utility at Nash equilibrium transaction
than the utility at the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium sharing.
Proposition 4.5. Define Q∞, ∈ P such that dQ∞,/dP0 =
(
1 + C∞,0 /δ1
)−1
. Then:
lim
m→∞
(
um,0 − um,∗0
)
=
1
δ1
VarQ∞,
(
C∞,0
)
,
lim
m→∞
(
um,1 − um,∗1
)
= − 1
δ1
VarQ∞,
(
C∞,0
)− δ1H(P0 |Q∞,).
The limiting loss for the risk averse agent comes from two sides. The first is (1/δ1)VarQ∞,
(
C∞,0
)
,
which is the limiting gain of agent 0. The remaining quantity δ1H
(
Q∞,∗|Q∞,) is in fact the loss
from the applied strategic behaviour as opposed to sharing in a Pareto optimal way. Both terms
are strictly positive as long as C∞,0 is not identically equal to zero.
The message of Proposition 4.5 is clear. The introduction of strategic behaviour allows agents
with high risk tolerance to achieve better prices that the more risk averse agents are willing to pay in
order to achieve risk reduction. In contrast to the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium where prices are given
by the optimal sharing measure, agents with sufficiently high risk tolerance are willing to accept
more risk in the Nash game, since their strategy drives the market to better cash compensation for
them. In fact, a more risk averse agent not only tends to undertake all the efficiency loss caused
by the game, but also fuels the utility gain of the (sufficiently) risk tolerant counterparty.
Recalling the discussion and notation of §3.3.5, we may offer some more detailed comments. From
(3.11) and Proposition 4.5, it follows that the marginal valuation measure of agent 0 approaches
the limiting optimal valuation measure Q∞,∗. This implies that, for large enough m ∈ N, the
security that agent 0 gets in Nash equilibrium is undervalued—indeed, note that EQ∞,∗
[
C∞,0
]
=
EQ∞,
[
C∞,0 (1 + C
∞,
0 /δ1)
]
= (1/δ1)VarQ∞,
(
C∞,0
)
. According to (3.15) and the discussion that
follows, we readily get that utility of agent 0 is increased. For the risk averse agent, the situation
is different. From (3.13), it follows that Qm,1 will be close to Qm, for large m ∈ N, which in turn
will be close to Q∞,. Hence, for large enough m ∈ N, the security received by agent 1 in Nash
equilibrium is overvalued; on top of this, agent 1 also carries all the risk-sharing inefficiency of
Nash equilibrium.
4.2. Both agents being extremely risk tolerant. We have seen above that the strategic be-
haviour of a high risk tolerant agent dominates the Nash game and drives the market to his
preferable transaction, regardless the actions of the other agent. Here, we shall examine what
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happens to the equilibria when both agents approach risk neutrality at the same speed. More pre-
cisely, we fix λ0 ∈ (0, 1) and λ1 ∈ (0, 1) with λ0 + λ1 = 1 and consider a non-decreasing sequence
(δm)m∈N such that limm→∞ δ
m =∞. Define δmi := λiδm for all m ∈ N and i ∈ {0, 1}. In contrast
to the set-up of §4.1, here the subjective beliefs of the agents will have to depend on m ∈ N. To
obtain intuition on why and how the subjective probabilities have to behave, note that according
to Theorem 1.2, for all m ∈ N the security Cm,∗0 is given as a multiple of δm0 of a random variable
whose dependence on risk tolerance comes only through λ0 and λ1. Since the latter weights are
fixed for each m ∈ N, in order to guarantee that the securities in Arrow-Debreu equilibrium have
a well-behaved limit, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 4.6. For i ∈ {0, 1}, there exists ξi ∈ L∞ such that EP [ξi] = 0 and
log
(
dPmi
dP
)
∼ ξi
δmi
, i ∈ {0, 1} , m ∈ N.
Note that condition EP [ξi] = 0 for i ∈ {0, 1} appearing in Assumption 4.6 is just a normalisation,
and does not constitute any loss of generality.
Theorem 4.7. In the above set-up, and under Assumption 4.6, the sequences
(
Cm,∗0
)
m∈N and(
Cm,0
)
m∈N converge in L
0 to limiting securities C∞,∗0 and C
∞,
0 , where
C∞,∗0 = λ1ξ0 − λ0ξ1, C∞,0 =
λ1
2
ξ0 − λ0
2
ξ1 =
C∞,∗0
2
.
The proof of Theorem 4.7 is given in §A.11. Interestingly, the risk neutrality of both agents
drives Nash equilibrium to the half of the Arrow-Debreu securities, which is an evidence of the
market inefficiency caused by the strategic behaviour of risk-neutral agents. The result of Theorem
4.7 is another manifestation of the claim (initially made in §3.3.5) that trading volume in Nash
equilibrium tends to be lower than Pareto-optimal allocations.
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1.2. Suppose that
(
Q∗, (C∗i )i∈I
)
is an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. We
shall show the necessity of (1.3) and (1.4). For all i ∈ I, note that Ui(C∗i ) ≥ Ui(0) = 0, which
implies that exp(−C∗i /δi) ∈ L1(Pi). Fix X ∈ L∞ with EQ∗ [X] = 0 and i ∈ I. Since the function
R 3  7→ Ui(C∗i + X) ∈ R has a maximum at  = 0, first order conditions and the dominated
convergence theorem, using the fact that exp(−C∗i /δi) ∈ L1(Pi), imply that EPi [exp (−C∗i /δi)X] =
0. The latter equality holds for all X ∈ L∞ with EQ∗ [X] = 0 and all i ∈ I; therefore, C∗i ∼
δi log (dPi/dQ∗), for all i ∈ I. Since EQ∗ [C∗i ] = 0, (1.4) follows. Furthermore, the fact that∑
i∈I C
∗
i = 0 gives
∑
i∈I δi log (dPi/dQ∗) ∼ 0, from which (1.3) follows.
Assume now that
(
Q∗, (C∗i )i∈I
)
is given by (1.3) and (1.4). The fact that EQ∗ [C∗i ] = 0
holds for all i ∈ I is immediate by definition. Furthermore, (1.3) and (1.4) give ∑i∈I C∗i ∼∑
i∈I δi log (dPi/dQ∗) ∼ δ
∑
i∈I λi log (dPi/dQ∗) ∼ 0; together with EQ∗ [C∗i ] = 0 for all i ∈ I, this
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implies that
∑
i∈I C
∗
i = 0. The fact that C
∗
i is optimal for agent i ∈ I under the valuation measure
Q∗ is argued in Remark 1.4. We have shown that
(
Q∗, (C∗i )i∈I
)
given by (1.3) and (1.4) is an
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. The necessity of (1.3) and (1.4) for Arrow-Debreu equilibrium proved
in the previous paragraph establishes its uniqueness.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2.2. In order to ease the reading, in the course of the proof of
Proposition 2.2 we shall denote Q(R−i,Rri) by Qri.
A.2.1. First-order conditions. We shall prove here the necessity of the stated conditions for best
response. Fix i ∈ I and Rri ∈ P such that Vi(Rri;R−i) = supRi∈P Vi(Ri;R−i) holds. For R0i ∈ P
defined via log dR0i ∼ (1/λ−i)
∑
j∈I\{i} λj log dRj , the resulting contract for agent i ∈ I would be
zero; therefore, Ui(Cri ) = Vi(Rri;R−i) ≥ Vi(R0i ;R−i) = 0. In particular we have that exp (−Cri/δi) ∈
L1(Pi), a fact that will be useful in several places applying the dominated convergence theorem in
the sequel.
Fix X ∈ L∞. For  ∈ R, define Ri() ∈ P via log (dRi()/dRri) ∼ −X/(λ−iδi). With Q() ≡
Q(R−i,Ri()), it follows that log (dQ()/dQri) ∼ −X/δ−i. In accordance with Cri , define Ci() =
δi log (dRi()/dQ()) + δiH (Q() |Ri()) and then, Ci(0) = Cri . Noting that
δi log
(
dRi()
dQ()
)
= δi log
(
dRi()
dRri
)
+ δi log
(
dRri
dQri
)
+ δi log
(
dQri
dQ()
)
∼ Cri − X,
it follows that Ci() = C
r
i − X −EQ() [Cri − X], where the constant in the equivalence above was
cancelled out by definition of Ci(). The dominated convergence theorem and simple differentiation,
using also the fact that EQri [C
r
i ] = 0, imply that
C ′i(0) =
∂Ci()
∂
∣∣∣
=0
= −X + EQri
[(
1 +
Cri
δ−i
)
X
]
.
Since Vi(R();R−i) = Ui(Ci()) holds for all  ∈ R, another application of the dominated conver-
gence theorem gives
∂Vi(R();R−i)
∂
∣∣∣
=0
=
EPi [exp(−Cri/δi)C ′i(0)]
EPi [exp(−Cri/δi)]
.
Since R 3  7→ Vi(R();R−i) is maximised at  = 0, first-order conditions give that
(A.1) 0 =
EPi [exp(−Cri/δi)C ′i(0)]
EPi [exp(−Cri/δi)]
= −EPi [exp(−C
r
i/δi)X]
EPi [exp(−Cri/δi)]
+ EQri
[(
1 +
Cri
δ−i
)
X
]
.
Noting that
∑
j∈I\{i} λj log (dRj/dPi) ∼ log (dQri/dPi)− λi log (dRri/dPi) implies
λ−i log
(
dQri
dPi
)
−
∑
j∈I\{i}
λj log
(
dRj
dPi
)
∼ λi log
(
dRri
dQri
)
,
it follows from Cri ∼ δi log (dRri/dQri) that
log
(
dQri
dPi
)
∼ C
r
i
δ−i
+
1
λ−i
∑
j∈I\{i}
λj log
(
dRj
dPi
)
.
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The last equivalence relation allows us to write (A.1) as
(A.2) EQri
− exp
ζi − Cri
λ−iδi
− 1
λ−i
∑
j∈I\{i}
λj log
(
dRj
dPi
)+ 1 + Cri
δ−i
X
 = 0,
where
(A.3) ζi = − logEPi
[
exp
(
−C
r
i
δi
)]
+ logEPi
exp( Cri
δ−i
) ∏
j∈I\{i}
(
dRj
dPi
)λj/λ−i .
Up to now, X ∈ L∞ was fixed, but arbitrary. Ranging X over L∞ in (A.2) gives
(A.4) exp
ζi − Cri
λ−iδi
− 1
λ−i
∑
j∈I\{i}
λj log
(
dRj
dPi
) = 1 + Cri
δ−i
.
Necessarily, Cri > −δ−i should hold. Taking logarithms and rearranging (A.4) gives (2.2).
A.2.2. Optimality of candidates for best response. We now proceed to showing that the necessary
conditions for best response are also sufficient. (As mentioned in the discussion following Theorem
2.7, we have not been able to show whether Vi(·;R−i) is concave; therefore, first order conditions
do not immediately imply optimality.) Fixing R ∈ P, and assuming the conditions stated, we shall
show below that Vi(R;R−i) ≤ Vi(Rri;R−i).
Define X := λi log (dR/dRri). Similarly to the arguments in §A.2.1 above, the contract that
agent i ∈ I would obtain by responding R ∈ P would be
CXi := C
r
i + δ−iX − EQX [Cri + δ−iX] ,
where QX ∈ P is such that log(dQX/dQri) ∼ X. It follows that
Vi(R;R−i)− Vi(Rri;R−i) = Ui(CXi )− Ui(Cri )(A.5)
= Ui(Cri + δ−iX)− Ui(Cri )−
EQri [exp (X) (C
r
i + δ−iX)]
EQri [exp (X)]
.
Remark A.1. If EQri [exp (X+)X+] = ∞ was true (equivalently, and since exp (X)X is bounded
below, if EQri [exp (X)X] =∞ was true), one would necessarily have EQri
[
exp (X)Cri
]
= −∞, which
is impossible in view of EQri [exp (X)] <∞ and Cri > −δ−i. It follows that EQri [exp (X+)X+] <∞.
Since Cri > −δ−i, one may define the (0,∞)-valued random variable Dri := 1 + Cri/δ−i. From
(2.5), it follows that −Cri/δi ∼ log (dQri/dPi) + logDri ; since EQri [Dri ] = 1, it actually holds that
exp(−Cri/δi) = EPi [exp(−Cri/δi)] (dQri/dPi)Dri . Therefore, we obtain
Ui(Cri + δ−iX)− Ui(Cri ) = −δi logEPi
[
exp
(
−C
r
i +Xδ−i
δi
)]
+ δi logEPi
[
exp
(
−C
r
i
δi
)]
= −δi logEQri
[
Dri exp
(
−δ−i
δi
X
)]
.
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Combining the previous, including (A.5) and Remark A.1, it suffices to show that
−δi logEQri [Dri exp (−δ−iX/δi)] ≤
EQri [exp (X) (C
r
i + δ−iX)]
EQri [exp (X)]
holds for all X ∈ L0 with EQri [exp (X+)X+] < ∞. Since Dri > 0 and EQri
[
Dri
]
= 1, an applica-
tion of Jensen’s inequality under the probability which has density Dri with respect to Qri gives
−δi logEQri [Dri exp (−δ−iX/δi)] ≤ δ−iEQri [DriX]. (In particular, EQri
[
DriX−
]
< ∞.) On the other
hand, upon defining χ := logEQri [exp (X)] ∈ R, note that
EQri [exp (X)C
r
i ]
EQri [exp (X)]
= EQri [exp (X − χ)Cri ] = δ−iEQri [Dri (exp (X − χ)− 1)] ,
where in the last equality we have used the facts Cri = δ−i(D
r
i − 1) and EQri [exp (X − χ)] = 1 =
EQri [D
r
i ]. Using the inequality exp(x) ≥ 1 + x, valid for all x ∈ R, we obtain that
EQri [exp (X)C
r
i ]
EQri [exp (X)]
≥ δ−iEQri [Dri(X − χ)] = δ−iEQri [DriX]− δ−i logEQri [exp (X)] .
(In particular, EQri [D
r
iX+] <∞, which implies that EQ [DriX] ∈ R.) Putting everything together,
it follows that it suffices to show that, for X ∈ L0 with EQri [exp (X+)X+] <∞, logEQri [exp (X)] ≤
EQri [exp (X)X] /EQri [exp (X)] holds. This inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality applied to
(0,∞) 3 z 7→ φ(z) = z log z, which is a convex function; then, φ(EQri [exp(X)]) ≤ EQri [φ(exp(X))],
which is exactly what was required.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2.7. Define R−i := (1/λ−i)
∑
j∈I\{i} λj log (dRj/dPi), and note that
exp(R−i) ∈ L1(Pi) holds in view of Ho¨lder’s inequality. For zi ∈ R implicitly define Ci(zi) ∈ L0 as
the (−δ−i,∞)-valued random variable satisfying (1/λ−i)Ci(zi)/δi+log (1 + Ci(zi)/δ−i) = zi−R−i.
Note that the existence and uniqueness of the solution Ci(zi) for each zi ∈ R follows from the fact
that the function (−1,∞) 3 y 7→ (δ/δi)y + log(1 + y) is strictly increasing from −∞ to ∞. For
zi ∈ R, define also the (0,∞)-valued random variable Di(zi) := 1 + Ci(zi)/δ−i, and note that it is
the unique solution to the equation
(A.6)
Di(zi)− 1
λi
+ logDi(zi) = zi −R−i.
Observe thatDi (and, as a consequence Ci) is increasing as a function of zi. It is also straightforward
to check that L0- limzi→−∞Di(zi) = 0 and L0- limzi→∞Di(zi) =∞.
Lemma A.2. For all zi ∈ R, it holds that
(A.7) 1 ∧ exp(zi −R−i) ≤ Di(zi) ≤ 1 ∨ exp(zi −R−i).
In particular, both Di(zi)
−λi exp(λ−iR−i) and Di(zi)λ−i exp(λ−iR−i) are in L1(Pi).
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Proof. Fix zi ∈ R. By (A.6), on the event {Di(zi) < 1} it holds that logDi(zi) ≥ zi−R−i, while on
the event {Di(zi) ≥ 1} it holds that logDi(zi) ≤ zi − R−i. These observations verify the inequal-
ities (A.7). Since Di(zi)
−1 ≤ 1 ∨ exp(−zi + R−i) and exp(R−i) ∈ L1(Pi), Di(zi)−1 ∈ L1(Pi)
follows; then, Ho¨lder’s inequality implies that Di(zi)
−λi exp(λ−iR−i) ∈ L1(Pi). Furthermore,
Di(zi)
λ−i exp(λ−iR−i) ≤ exp(λ−izi) ∨ exp(λ−iR−i), which implies that Di(zi)λ−i exp(λ−iR−i) ∈
L1(Pi) because exp(R−i) ∈ L1(Pi). 
In view of Lemma A.2, for each zi ∈ R one may define Qi(zi) ∈ P via
log (dQi(zi)/dPi) ∼ −λi logDi(zi) + λ−iR−i ∼ Di(zi) +R−i;
in other words, log (dQi(zi)/dPi) ∼ −λi log (1 + Ci(zi)/δ−i) +
∑
j∈I\{i} λj log (dRj/dPi). Further-
more, for zi ∈ R, Lemma A.2 and in particular the fact that Di(zi)λ−i exp(λ−iR−i) ∈ L1(Pi) implies
that Di(zi) (dQi(zi)/dPi) ∈ L1(Pi), which in turn implies that Di(zi) ∈ L1(Qi(zi)). As mentioned
in the discussion following the statement of Proposition 2.2, in order to establish Theorem 2.7, we
need to show that there exists a unique ζi ∈ R with the property that EQi(ζi) [Di(ζi)] = 1. Define
the function fi : R 7→ (0,∞] via fi(zi) = EQi(zi) [Di(zi)], for zi ∈ R. Since Di(zi) ∈ L1(Qi(zi)) for
all zi ∈ R, it follows that fi(zi) <∞ for all zi ∈ R. It is straightforward to check fi is continuous,
in view of the dominated convergence theorem and Lemma A.2.
Let Pi be the probability measure in P such that log
(
dPi/dPi
) ∼ R−i. Then, thanks to the
equivalence relation log (dQi(zi)/dPi) ∼ Di(zi) +R−i, it holds that
(A.8) fi(zi) =
EPi [exp(Di(zi))Di(zi)]
EPi [exp(Di(zi))]
,
for all zi ∈ R. In fact, since the covariance of exp(Di(zi)) and Di(zi) is non-negative under any
probability, we have that fi(zi) ≥ EPi [Di(zi)], for all zi ∈ R. Using the monotone convergence
theorem and the relationship (A.8), limzi→∞ fi(zi) =∞ follows from limzi→∞Di(zi) =∞. Further-
more, the monotone convergence theorem and the fact that limzi→−∞Di(zi) = 0 imply the limiting
relationships limzi→−∞ EPi [exp(Di(zi))] = 1 and limzi→−∞ EPi [exp(Di(zi))Di(zi)] = 0, from which
we obtain limzi→−∞ fi(zi) = 0. It follows that there exists at least one ζi ∈ R such that fi(ζi) = 1.
We also claim that fi is strictly increasing, which implies that ζi is indeed unique. In preparation,
note that differentiating (A.6) with respect to zi and rearranging gives D
′
i(zi) = qi(Di(zi)), where
(0,∞) 3 y 7→ qi(y) := λiy/ (λi + y). In particular, since qi is an increasing function, the covariance
betweenD′i(zi) andDi(zi) will be non-negative for all zi ∈ R under any probability. Straightforward
computations using the definition of Qi(zi) for zi ∈ R give f ′i(zi) = EQi(zi) [D′i(zi) +Di(zi)D′i(zi)]−
EQi(zi) [Di(zi)]EQi(zi) [D
′
i(zi)] = EQi(zi) [D
′
i(zi)] + CovQi(zi) (Di(zi), D
′
i(zi)). Since D
′
i(zi) > 0 and
CovQi(zi) (Di(zi), D
′
i(zi)) ≥ 0 for all zi ∈ R, Theorem 2.7 has been proved.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 3.2. Suppose that (Q, (Ci )i∈I) is a Nash equilibrium and let (Ri )i∈I ∈
PI be the associated revealed subjective beliefs. We shall first prove the relationship (3.3).
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In view of Proposition 2.2, and since Ci /δi ∼ log (dRi /dQ) and
∑
j∈I\{i} λj log
(
dRj/dPi
)
=
log (dQ/dPi)− λi log (dRi /dPi), (2.2) gives
−λ−i log
(
1 +
Cri
δ−i
)
∼ C

i
δi
+
∑
j∈I\{i}
λj log
(
dRj
dPi
)
∼ λ−i log
(
dRi
dPi
)
,
i.e., log (dRi /dPi) ∼ − log (1 + Ci /δ−i), for all i ∈ I, which is (3.5). Since log (dPi/dQ∗) ∼ C∗i /δi
holds for all i ∈ I (see (1.4)), it follows that λi log (dRi /dQ∗) ∼ −λi log (1 + Cri/δ−i) +C∗i /δ for all
i ∈ I. In turn, and since ∑j∈I C∗j = 0, the latter gives log (dQ/dQ∗) ∼∑j∈I λj log (dRj/dQ∗),
which, in view of (3.5), is exactly (3.3).
To prove (3.2), we add λi log (1 + C

i /δ−i) ∼ −λi log (dRi /dPi) to (2.2), and obtain
Ci
δi
+ log
(
1 +
Ci
δ−i
)
∼ −
∑
j∈I
λj log
(
dRj
dPi
)
∼ log
(
dPi
dQ
)
∼ C
∗
i
δi
− log
(
dQ
dQ∗
)
.
The latter equivalence, combined with (3.3), gives (3.2) for appropriate z ≡ (zi )i∈I ∈ RI . The
market clearing conditions
∑
i∈I C

i = 0 =
∑
i∈I C
∗
i show that
∑
i∈I z

i = 0, i.e., z
 ∈ ∆I . Finally,
the fact that EQ [Ci ] = 0 holds for all i ∈ I results directly from (Ci )i∈I ∈ CQ .
For the proof of the reverse implication, assume that conditions (N1), (N2) and (N3) hold for
(Q, (Ci )i∈I), and fix i ∈ I. Define the associate revealed subjective beliefs (Ri )i∈I ∈ PI via
log(dRi /dQ) ∼ Ci /δi. Since C∗i /δi ∼ log(dPi/dQ∗), a combination of (3.2) and (3.3) gives
log (1 + Ci /δ−i) ∼ − log (dRi /dPi). Using again (3.2) and (3.3),
Ci
δi
+ λ−i log
(
1 +
Ci
δ−i
)
∼ C
∗
i
δi
− log
(
dQ
dQ∗
)
− λi log
(
1 +
Ci
δ−i
)
∼ − log
(
dQ
dPi
)
+ λi log
(
dRi
dPi
)
∼ −
∑
j∈I\{i}
λj log
(
dRj
dPi
)
.
It follows that the sufficient conditions for optimality of Proposition 2.2 are satisfied for each i ∈ I.
In order to show that (Q, (Ci )i∈I) is a Nash equilibrium, it is left to verify that (Ci )i∈I ∈ CQ .
Indeed, summing (3.2) with respect to i implies that
∑
i∈I C

i = 0, since z
 is assumed to belong
in ∆I . This fact, together with the requirement Ci > −δ−i, implies the uniform boundedness of
Ci ; in particular, exp(C

i /δi) ∈ L1(Q) for all i ∈ I. Taking also (3) into account, we conclude
that (Ci )i∈I ∈ CQ , which completes the proof.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3.5. Fix z ∈ ∆I . Suppose for the moment that a solution to (3.17)
indeed exists, and set
(A.9) L(z) :=
∑
i∈I
λi log
(
1 +
Ci(z)
δ−i
)
.
Then, with ηi : (0,∞) 7→ R defined via ηi(x) = δ−i(x − 1) + δi log x, for all x ∈ (0,∞), (3.17)
implies that ηi (1 + Ci(z)/δ−i) = zi+C∗i +δiL(z) holds for all i ∈ I. With θi : R 7→ (0,∞) denoting
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the inverse of ηi for all i ∈ I, it follows that
(A.10) Ci(z) = δ−i [θi (zi + C∗i + δiL(z))− 1] , ∀i ∈ I.
Plugging back into the definition of L(z) in (A.9), we obtain that
(A.11) L(z) =
∑
i∈I
λi log θi (zi + C
∗
i + δiL(z))
should be satisfied.
We now proceed backwards, by showing that (A.11) has a unique solution. With z ∈ ∆I fixed,
define w : Ω×R 7→ R via w(y) = y−∑i∈I λi log θi (zi + C∗i + δiy) for y ∈ R, where the dependence
of w in ω ∈ Ω is suppressed. The derivative of w with respect to the spatial coordinate is
w′(y) = 1−
∑
i∈I
λi
1 + (δ−i/δi)θi (zi + C∗i + δiy)
=
∑
i∈I
λ−iθi (zi + C∗i + δiy)
1 + (δ−i/δi)θi (zi + C∗i + δiy)
> 0,
for all y ∈ R. Since θi(y) behaves sub-linearly as y → ∞, limy↑∞w(y) = ∞ follows in a straight-
forward way. Furthermore, from the definition of θi we obtain that x < δi log θi(x) holds for all
x ∈ (−∞, 0) and i ∈ I. This implies that on the event
{
y < − ∨j∈I
(
(zj + C
∗
j )/δj
)}
, one has
w(y) < y −∑i∈I(1/δ) (zi + C∗i + δiy) = 0, which shows both that the equation w(L(z)) = 0 has a
unique solution, and that
(A.12) − L(z) ≤
∨
j∈I
C∗j + zj
δj
≤
∨
j∈I
zj
δj
+
∨
j∈I
C∗j
δj
,
Given the existence of a unique L(z) solving (A.11), Ci(z) is specified for all i ∈ I via (A.10).
Since exp(C∗i /δi) ∈ L1(Q∗) holds for all i ∈ I, it is straightforward that exp(
∨
i∈I C
∗
i /δi) ∈
L1(Q∗). Therefore, (A.12) and the equality
∏
j∈I (1 + Cj(z)/δ−j)
−λj = exp (−L(z)) imply the
validity of (3.18), which concludes the proof.
A.6. Proof of Theorem 3.7. We first establish the general existence result, and then tackle
uniqueness in the two-agent case.
A.6.1. Proof of existence of Nash equilibrium. We use notation from Proposition 3.5 and the dis-
cussion following it. For each z ∈ ∆I and i ∈ I, define ui(z) := Ui(Ci(z)). Furthermore, for each
z ∈ ∆I define u(z) := ∑i∈I u(z), as well as
∆I 3 z 7→ φi(z) = ui(z)− u∗i + λi (u∗ − u(z)) , i ∈ I, z ∈ ∆I .
Note that
∑
i∈I φi(z) = 0 for all z ∈ ∆I , so that φ ≡ (φi)i∈I is ∆I -valued. The obvious continuity
of ∆I 3 z 7→ L(z) from (A.11) and the domination relation given by (A.12) allow the application
of the dominated convergence theorem to establish that φ : ∆I 7→ ∆I is a continuous function.
Lemma A.3. z ∈ ∆I corresponds to a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is a fixed point of φ.
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Proof. In view of the discussion in §3.3.4, if z ∈ ∆I corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, then z
is a fixed point of φ. Conversely, we shall show that any fixed point of φ corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium point. With L(z) as in (A.9), and recalling (3.17), start by observing that
Ci(z)− zi − u∗i = δi log
(
dPi
dQ∗
)
+ δiL(z)− δi log
(
1 +
Ci(z)
δ−i
)
, i ∈ I, z ∈ ∆I .
From the last equality, it follows that
ui(z)− zi − u∗i = −δi logEQ∗
[
exp(−L(z))
(
1 +
Ci(z)
δ−i
)]
, i ∈ I, z ∈ ∆I .
Adding up the previous equality over all agents, we obtain
u(z)− u∗ = −δ
∑
j∈I
λj logEQ∗
[
exp(−L(z))
(
1 +
Cj(z)
δ−j
)]
, z ∈ ∆I .
Since log (dQ(z)/dQ∗) = −L(z) + λ(z) for appropriate λ(z) ∈ R and φi(z)− zi = ui(z)− zi− u∗i −
λi(u(z)− u∗) holds for all i ∈ I and z ∈ ∆I , it follows that
φi(z)− zi = −δi logEQ(z)
[
1 +
Ci(z)
δ−i
]
+ δi
∑
j∈I
λj logEQ(z)
[
1 +
Cj(z)
δ−j
]
, i ∈ I, z ∈ ∆I ,
where note that the quantity λ(z) cancels out in the above equation. Now, suppose that z ∈ ∆I is a
fixed point of φ. From the last equality, it follows that the quantities EQ(z) [1 + Ci(z)/δ−i] have the
same value, which we call x(z), for all i ∈ I. In other words, EQ(z) [Ci(z)] = δ−i (x(z)− 1) holds
for all i ∈ I. Since∑i∈I Ci(z) = 0, we obtain that x(z) = 1, which implies that EQ(z) [Ci(z)] = 0
holds for all i ∈ I, in turn implying that z corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. 
In view of Lemma A.3, existence of a Nash equilibrium will follow if we can show that φ has
at least one fixed point. For any z ∈ ∆I and i ∈ I, the strong bound Ci(z) > −δ−i implies
ui(z) ≥ −δ−i. Furthermore, u(z) ≤ u∗ holds for all z ∈ ∆I , from aggregate optimality of Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium. Therefore, it follows that
φi(z) = ui(z)− u∗i + λi (u∗ − u(z)) ≥ −δ−i − u∗i , i ∈ I, z ∈ ∆I .
Define the set K :=
{
z ∈ ∆I | zi ≥ −δ−i − u∗i , ∀i ∈ I
}
, and note that K is a compact and convex
subset of ∆I . Since φ is continuous and maps K to K, Brower’s fixed point theorem implies that φ
has at least one fixed point on K, which establishes the claim. (In fact, according to the discussion
in §3.3.4, any fixed point has to live in the smaller set {z ∈ ∆I | zi ≥ −u∗i , ∀i ∈ I}.)
A.6.2. Proof of uniqueness in the two-agent case. Note that (z0, z1) ∈ ∆I if and only if z0 = −z1.
In the course of the proof, we identify R and ∆I via R 3 z ↔ (z,−z) ∈ ∆I , i.e., considering
only the “zero” coordinate. Correspondingly, for z ∈ R we write Ci(z) instead of Ci ((z,−z)) for
i ∈ {0, 1}; similarly, for z ∈ R we write L(z) instead of L(z,−z) of (A.9).
In view of Proposition 3.6, as well the equality C1(z) = −C0(z) for all z ∈ R, we need to prove
the existence of a unique z ∈ R such that EQ(z) [C0(z)] = 0 holds; since existence was already
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established, we shall only focus on uniqueness here. Define the continuous function R 3 z 7→
f0(z) = EQ(z) [C0(z)]; then, it suffices to show that f0 is strictly increasing.
Recall that C1(z) = −C0(z) holds for all z ∈ R, and rewrite (3.17) as
(A.13) C0(z) +
δ0δ1
δ
log
(
1 + C0(z)/δ1
1− C0(z)/δ0
)
= z + C∗0 , ∀z ∈ R.
Differentiating with respect to z ∈ R, after some algebra one obtains that
C ′0(z) =
(δ1 + C0(z))(δ0 − C0(z))
δ0δ1 + (δ1 + C0(z))(δ0 − C0(z)) , ∀z ∈ R.
Since −δ1 < C0(z) < δ0, C ′0(z) is clearly a (0,∞)-valued random variable for all z ∈ R. Fur-
thermore, recalling that L(z) = λ0 log(1 + C0(z)/δ1) + λ1 log(1− C0(z)/δ0) holds for z ∈ R, after
differentiation and algebra we obtain
L′(z) =
(δ0 − δ1)− C0(z)
(δ1 + C0(z))(δ0 − C0(z))C
′
0(z) =
(δ0 − δ1)− C0(z)
δ0δ1 + (δ1 + C0(z))(δ0 − C0(z)) , ∀z ∈ R.
In other words, with q(x) = (x+ δ1 − δ0) / (δ0δ1 + (δ1 + x)(δ0 − x)) for x ∈ (−δ1, δ0), L′(z) =
−q(C0(z)) holds for all z ∈ R. Since q′(x) =
(
2δ0δ1 + (x+ δ1 − δ0)2
)
/ (δ0δ1 + (δ1 + x)(δ0 − x))2 >
0 holds for all x ∈ (−δ1, δ0), the covariance between C0(z) and −L′(z) is non-negative under
any probability, for all z ∈ R. Continuing, if we take into account that log (dQ(z)/dPi) ∼
log (dQ(z)/dQ∗) + log (dQ∗/dPi) ∼ −L(z) − C∗i /δi for all i ∈ I, it is straightforward to com-
pute that f ′0(z) = EQ(z) [C ′0(z)] − CovQ(z) (C0(z), L′(z)) holds for all z ∈ R. Since C ′0(z) is a
(0,∞)-valued random variable and CovQ(z) (C0(z), L′(z)) ≤ 0 for all z ∈ R, the claim is proved.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 4.2. For the remainder of Appendix A, define δm := δm0 + δ1, λ
m
0 :=
δm0 /δ
m and λm1 := δ1/δ
m = 1 − λm0 for all m ∈ N. In view of Theorem 1.2 and the fact that
L0- limm→∞ (dQm,∗/dP0) = 1, we need to focus on the limit of the sequence (H(Qm,∗ |P1))m∈N.
For each m ∈ N, similarly to the equation (4.1), it holds that
dQm,∗
dP1
= EP1
[(
dP0
dP1
)λm0 ]−1(dP0
dP1
)λm0
.
Therefore, with Z := dP0/dP1 and φ(x) = x log x, it holds that
H(Qm,∗ |P1) =
EP1
[
φ(Zλ
m
0 )
]− φ (EP1 [Zλm0 ])
EP1
[
Zλ
m
0
]
Under Assumption 4.1, the fact that limm→∞ λm0 = 1 and the dominated convergence theorem give
that limm→∞H(Qm,∗ |P1) = EP1 [φ(Z)] = H(P0 |P1). Since Cm,∗0 = −Cm,∗1 = δ1 log(dQm,∗/dP1)−
δ1H(Qm,∗ |P1), the limiting relationship C∞,∗0 = δ1 log(dP0/dP1)− δ1H(P0 |P1) readily follows.
Continuing, for m ∈ N, note that um,∗0 = U0(Cm,∗0 ) ≤ EP0
[
Cm,∗0
]
. Note that there exists c > 0
such that supm∈N
∣∣Cm,∗0 ∣∣ ≤ c (1 + |log(dP0/dP1)|). Under Assumption 4.1, log(dP0/dP1) ∈ L1(P0),
which means that the dominated convergence theorem can be applied and gives lim supm→∞ u
m,∗
0 ≤
EP0
[
C∞,∗0
]
= 0. Since 0 ≤ um,∗0 holds for all m ∈ N, limm→∞ um,∗0 = 0 follows.
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Moving on to agent 1, the fact that um,∗1 = δ1H(Qm,∗ |P1) holds for all m ∈ N and the previous
discussion gives limm→∞ u
m,∗
1 = δ1H(P0 |P1). The proof is complete.
A.8. Proof of Lemma 4.3. Since the function (−1,∞) 3 x 7→ x+log (1 + x) is strictly increasing
and continuous and maps (−1,∞) to (−∞,∞), it follows that L0- limz→−∞C∞0 (z) = −δ1 and
L0- limz→∞C∞0 (z) = ∞. Let D∞0 (z) := 1 + C∞0 (z)/δ1, for all z ∈ R. On {C∞0 (z) > 0} it holds
that 1/D∞0 (z) ≤ 1. On {C∞0 (z) ≤ 0}, it holds that δ1 logD∞0 (z) ≥ C∞0 (z) + δ1 logD∞0 (z) = z +
C∞,∗0 , which implies that 1/D
∞
0 (z) ≤ exp
(−(z + C∞,∗0 )/δ1) = exp (H(P0 |P1)− z/δ1) (dP1/dP0).
Therefore, since 1/D∞0 (z) ≤ 1 ∨ exp (H(P0 |P1)− z/δ1) (dP1/dP0) holds everywhere, Assumption
4.1 implies that the function R 3 z 7→ EP0 [1/D∞0 (z)] = EP0
[
(1 + C∞0 (z)/δ1)
−1
]
is (0,∞)-valued,
continuous, strictly decreasing and, in view of the limiting behaviour of R 3 z 7→ C∞0 (z) and the
monotone convergence theorem, maps R to (0,∞). Therefore, the result follows.
A.9. Proof of Theorem 4.4. In order to ease the reading throughout the proof, for all m ∈ N
define the (0, 1/λm1 )-valued random variable D
m,
0 := 1 + C
m,
0 /δ1 and the (0,∞)-valued random
variable Dm,r0 := 1 + C
m,r
0 /δ1. We use the obvious notation Qm, ∈ P for m ∈ N. As in (2.5), let
Qm,r0 ∈ P be defined via
log
(
dQm,r0
dP0
)
∼ −λm0 log
(
1 +
Cm,r0
δ1
)
+ λm1 log
(
dP1
dP0
)
,
and recall that EQm,r0
[
Cm,r0
]
= 0 for all m ∈ N, as follows from Proposition 2.2.
For each m ∈ N, define wm : (0,∞) 7→ R and φm : (0, 1/λm1 ) 7→ R via
wm(x) = δ1 (x− 1) + λm0 δ1 log(x), x ∈ (0,∞),(A.14)
φm(x) = δ1 (x− 1) + λm0 δ1 log
(
λm0 x
1− λm1 x
)
, x ∈ (0, 1/λm1 ),(A.15)
and note by the equivalence Cm,∗0 ∼ δm0 log (dP0/dQm,∗) ∼ δm0 λm1 log (dP0/dP1), and equations
(2.2) and (3.4), that
(A.16) wm(Dm,r0 ) = z
m,r
0 + C
m,∗
0 , φ
m(Dm,0 ) = z
m,
0 + C
m,∗
0 , ∀m ∈ N,
for an appropriate sequence
(
zm,r0
)
m∈N from Theorem 2.7 and the sequence
(
zm,0
)
m∈N from The-
orem 3.2. The next two results show in particular that (zm,0 )m∈N and (z
m,r
0 )m∈N are bounded.
Lemma A.4. The sequence (zm,0 )m∈N is bounded (in R), and there exists a ∈ R such that
(A.17) log
(
1/Dm,0
) ≤ a+ log (dP1/dP0) , holds on {Dm,0 ≤ 1} , ∀m ∈ N.
Proof. Note that EQm,
[
Cm,0
]
= 0 is equivalent to EQm,
[
Dm,0
]
= 1, for all m ∈ N.
Applying (3.2) for i = 1, and using (3.3) and the fact that Cm,∗1 /δ1 ∼ log (dP1/dQm,∗), it follows
that
Cm,1
δ1
+ log
(
1 +
Cm,1
δm0
)
∼ C
m,∗
1
δ1
+ log
(
dQm,∗
dQm,
)
∼ log
(
dP1
dQm,
)
.
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Coupling the last equivalence with Cm,1 /δ1 = −Cm,0 /δ1 = 1−Dm,0 and after some extra algebra,
we obtain the further equivalence log (dQm,/dP1) ∼ Dm,0 − log
(
1− λm1 Dm,0
)
. Therefore,
1 = EQm,
[
Dm,0
]
=
EP1
[
exp(Dm,0 )D
m,
0 /
(
1− λm1 Dm,0
)]
EP1
[
exp(Dm,0 )/
(
1− λm1 Dm,0
)] ≥ EP1[Dm,0 ], ∀m ∈ N,
where the last inequality follows from CovP1
(
exp(Dm,0 )/
(
1− λm1 Dm,0
)
, Dm,0
) ≥ 0, holding for all
m ∈ N. Since that EP1
[
Dm,0
] ≤ 1 for all m ∈ N, (Dm,0 )m∈N is L0-bounded.
Similarly, apply (3.2) (for i = 0), we obtain
Cm,0
δm0
+ log
(
1 +
Cm,0
δ1
)
∼ C
m,∗
0
δm0
+ log
(
dQm,∗
dQm,
)
∼ log
(
dP0
dQm,
)
,
or, equivalently, log (dQm,/dP0) ∼ −δ1Dm,0 /δm0 − logDm,0 . It follows that
1 =
1
EQm,
[
Dm,0
] = EP0 [(1/Dm,0 ) exp(−δ1Dm,0 /δm0 )]
EP0
[
exp(−δ1Dm,0 /δm0 )
] ≥ EP0 [1/Dm,0 ] , ∀m ∈ N,
where the last inequality follows since CovP0
(
exp(−δ1Dm,0 /δm0 ), 1/Dm,0
) ≥ 0 holds for all m ∈ N.
The fact that EP0
[
1/Dm,0
] ≤ 1 holds for all m ∈ N implies that (1/Dm,0 )m∈N is L0-bounded.
We then obtain that
(
logDm,0
)
m∈N is bounded in L
0, from which it follows that the family{
φm(Dm,0 ) |m ∈ N
}
is bounded in L0. As
(
Cm,∗0
)
m∈N converges in L
0, (A.16) implies that the
family
{
zm,0 |m ∈ N
}
is bounded (in R).
Continuing, since x ∈ (0, 1) implies φm (x) ≤ λm0 δ1 log(x), on the event
{
Dm,0 ≤ 1
}
it follows
that log
(
Dm,0
) ≥ (1/λm0 δ1)φm (Dm,0 ) = (1/λm0 δ1) (zm, + Cm,∗0 ) holds. A combination of the
equality Cm,∗0 = δ
m
0 log (dP0/dQm,∗) + u
m,∗
0 and (4.1) gives
(A.18)
Cm,∗0
λm0 δ1
= − log
(
dP1
dP0
)
+
1
λm1
logEP0
[(
dP1
dP0
)λm1 ]
+
um,∗0
λm0 δ1
, ∀m ∈ N.
The second and third term of the right-hand-side of the above equation converge (to −H(P0 |P1)
and zero, respectively) and the sequence (zm,/λm0 )m∈N is bounded in R; therefore, the existence
of a ∈ R such that (A.17) holds readily follows. 
Lemma A.5. The sequence
(
zm,r0
)
m∈N is bounded in R, and there exists c ∈ R such that
log(1/Dm,r0 ) ≤ c+ log (dP1/dP0) holds on {Dm,r0 ≤ 1}, ∀m ∈ N.(A.19)
logDm,r0 ≤ c− log (dP1/dP0) holds on {Dm,r0 > 1}, ∀m ∈ N.(A.20)
Proof. Recall that EQm,r0
[
Dm,r0
]
= 1, for all m ∈ N. In view of (2.2), we obtain
logDm,r0 ∼ − log
(
dP1
dP0
)
− D
m,r
0
λm0
, ∀m ∈ N.
Further, due to (2.5), it holds that log
(
dQm,r0 /dP0
) ∼ −λm0 logDm,r0 + λm1 log (dP1/dP0). The
last two equivalences give log
(
dQm,r0 /dP1
) ∼ Dm,r0 . Therefore, it holds that 1 = EQm,r0 [Dm,r0 ] =
EP1
[
exp
(
Dm,r0
)
Dm,r0
]
/EP1
[
exp
(
Dm,r0
)] ≥ EP1[Dm,r0 ] for all m ∈ N, where the last inequality
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follows from the fact that CovP1
(
exp(Dm,r0 ), D
m,r
0
) ≥ 0 holds for all m ∈ N. It follows that
EP1
[
Dm,r0
] ≤ 1 for all m ∈ N, which implies that (Dm,r0 )m∈N is L0-bounded. Hence, the family{
wm(Dm,r0 ) |m ∈ N
}
is also bounded from above in L0. Since
(
Cm,∗0
)
converges in L0, (A.16)
implies that
(
zm,r0
)
m∈N is bounded from above (in R).
By way of contradiction, suppose that
(
zm,r0
)
m∈N is not bounded from below. Passing to a
subsequence if necessary, we may assume that (zm,r0 )m∈N is a sequence of negative numbers with
limm→∞ z
m,r
0 = −∞. Hence, again by (A.16) we get that limm→∞Dm,r0 = 0. Since zm,r0 ≤ 0
for all m ∈ N, and x + log x ≤ 1/λm0 + (1/λm0 δ1)wm(x) holds for all x ≥ 1, it follows that
Dm,r0 + logD
m,r
0 ≤ 1/λm0 + Cm,∗0 /λm0 δ1 holds on
{
Dm,r0 > 1
}
, for all m ∈ N. Given (A.18), we
conclude the existence of κ ∈ R such that Dm,r0 +logDm,r0 ≤ κ+log (dP0/dP1) holds on
{
Dm,r0 > 1
}
,
for all m ∈ N. It follows that one can use the dominated convergence theorem on the right-hand-
side of the equality EQm,r0
[
Dm,r0
]
= EP1
[
exp
(
Dm,r0
)
Dm,r0
]
/EP1
[
exp
(
Dm,r0
)]
, valid for all m ∈ N,
and obtain limm→∞ EQm,r0
[
Dm,r0
]
= 0, which contradicts the fact that EQm,r0
[
Dm,r0
]
= 1 holds for all
m ∈ N. We conclude that (zm,r0 )m∈N is bounded from below too.
To show (A.19), note that wm(x) ≤ λm0 δ1 log(x) holds when 0 < x ≤ 1; hence, log(Dm,r0 ) ≥
(zm,r0 + C
m,∗
0 )/(λ
m
0 δ1) holds on {Dm,r0 ≤ 1} for all m ∈ N. From (A.18), we obtain that
log(1/Dm,r0 )− log (dP1/dP0) ≤ −
1
λm1
logEP0
[(
dP1
dP0
)λm1 ]
− z
m,r
0 + u
m,∗
0
λm0 δ1
, ∀m ∈ N.
The right-hand-side of the above inequality is bounded in R; therefore, (A.19) follows. Similarly,
since λm0 δ1 log(x) ≤ wm(x) holds when x > 1, log(Dm,r0 ) ≤ (zm,r0 +Cm,∗0 )/(λm0 δ1) holds on {Dm,r0 >
1} for all m ∈ N. Using the same estimates from (A.18) that were used to establish (A.19), (A.20)
follows. 
We now show that we have the expected limiting behaviour through subsequences.
Lemma A.6. Let z∞,0 be given as in Lemma 4.3. If (z
mk,
0 )k∈N is any convergent subsequence
of (zm,0 )m∈N, we have limk→∞ z
mk,
0 = z
∞,
0 and L0- limk→∞C
mk,
0 = C
∞
0 (z
∞,
0 ). Similarly, if(
zmk,r0
)
k∈N is any convergent subsequence of
(
zm,r0
)
m∈N, then it holds that limk→∞ z
mk,r
0 = z
∞,
0
and L0- limk→∞Cmk,r0 = C∞0 (z
∞,
0 ).
Proof. Set ẑ∞0 := limk→∞ z
mk,
0 and z˜
∞
0 := limk→∞ z
mk,r
0 . Define the function (0,∞) 3 x 7→
φ(x) = δ1 (x− 1) + δ1 log (x), and note that both (φm)m∈N of (A.15) and (wm)m∈N of (A.14)
converge uniformly to φ on compact subsets of (0,∞). This fact, combined with (A.16), Lemma
A.4 and Lemma A.5 implies that (Dmk,0 )k∈N has a (0,∞)-valued L0-limit D̂∞0 = 1 + Ĉ∞0 /δ1 and
(Dmk,r0 )k∈N has a (0,∞)-valued L0-limit D˜∞0 = 1 + C˜∞0 /δ1, satisfying φ(D̂∞0 ) = ẑ∞0 + C∞,∗0 and
φ(D˜∞0 ) = z˜∞0 + C
∞,∗
0 .
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We first tackle the Nash equilibrium case. In the proof of Lemma A.4, the equality
EP0
[
(1/Dmk,0 ) exp(−δ1Dmk,0 /δmk0 )
]
EP0
[
exp(−δ1Dmk,0 /δmk0 )
] = 1, ∀k ∈ N,
was established. Since limk→∞ δ
mk
0 = ∞ and exp(−δ1Dmk,0 /δmk0 ) ≤ 1 holds for all k ∈ N, (A.17)
allows use of the dominated convergence theorem to obtain EP0
[
(1+Ĉ∞0 /δ1)−1
]
= EP0
[
1/D̂∞0
]
= 1.
Due to Lemma 4.3, it then follows that ẑ∞0 = z
∞,
0 , which also implies that Ĉ
∞
0 = C
∞,
0 (z
∞,
0 ).
We continue to deal with the best response case. Since (2.5) implies that log (dQmk,r/dP0) ∼
−λmk0 logDmk,r0 + λmk1 log (dP1/dP0), we obtain
1 =
1
EQmk,r
[
Dmk,r0
] = EP0
[(
Dmk,r0
)−λmk0 (dP1/dP0)λmk1 ]
EP0
[(
Dmk,r0
)λmk1 (dP1/dP0)λmk1 ] , ∀k ∈ N.
By the domination relationship in (A.19), one may apply the dominated convergence theorem in
the numerator above to obtain
lim
k→∞
EP0
[(
Dmk,r0
)−λmk0 (dP1/dP0)λmk1 ] = EP0 [1/D˜∞0 ] .
Similarly, the domination relationship in (A.19) allows one to apply the dominated convergence
theorem in the denominator above to obtain
lim
k→∞
EP0
[(
Dmk,r0
)λmk1 (dP1/dP0)λmk1 ] = 1.
Combining everything, we obtain EP0
[
1/D˜∞0
]
= 1, and by Lemma 4.3, it follows that z˜∞0 = z
∞,
0
and D˜∞0 = 1 + C∞0 (z
∞,
0 )/δ0, which in turn implies that C˜
∞
0 = C
∞
0 (z
∞,
0 ). 
We are now in position to finish the proof of Theorem 4.4. If L0- limm→∞Cm,0 = C∞0 (z
∞,
0 )
would fail, there would exist  ∈ (0, 1) and a subsequence (Cmk,0 )k∈N of (Cm,)m∈N such that
E
[
1 ∧ |Cmk,r0 − C∞0 (z∞,0 )|
]
>  holds for all k ∈ N. Since the sequence (zmk,0 )k∈N is bounded
by Lemma A.4, there exists a further subsequence of (zmk,0 )k∈N that is convergent. Then,
Lemma A.6 implies that there exists a further subsequence of (Cmk,0 )k∈N that L0-converges to
C∞0 (z
∞,
0 ), contradicting that E
[
1 ∧ |Cmk,0 − C∞0 (z∞,0 )|
]
>  holds for all k ∈ N. The proof that
L0- limm→∞Cm,r0 = C∞0 (z
∞,
0 ) is carried out in the exact same way, using Lemma A.5 in place of
Lemma A.4.
A.10. Proof of Proposition 4.5. Recall that um,0 = −δm0 logEP0
[
exp
(−Cm,0 /δm0 )], for all
m ∈ N. On one hand, um,0 ≤ EP0
[
Cm,0
]
holds for all m ∈ N. From (3.4) and (A.16), we
get that on the event
{
Cm,0 > 0
}
, it holds that Cm,0 ≤ zm,0 + Cm,∗0 for all m ∈ N. Therefore,
by (A.18), Lemma A.4 and Proposition 4.2, there exists a constant k > 0 such that Cm,0 ≤
k + log+(dP0/dP1) holds for all m ∈ N. By Assumption 4.1 and (the reverse version of) Fatou’s
lemma, it follows that lim supm→∞ u
m,
0 ≤ EP0
[
C∞,0
]
. On the other hand, since limm→∞ δm0 =∞,
for all k ∈ N it follows that lim infm→∞ um,0 ≥ lim infm→∞
(−k logEP0 [exp(−Cm,0 /k)]) =
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−k logEP0
[
exp(−C∞,0 /k)
]
, where the last equality follows from the dominated convergence the-
orem, where the fact that −Cm,0 ≤ δ1 holds for all m ∈ N is also used. Sending k → ∞,
lim infm→∞ u
m,
0 ≥ limk→∞
(−k logEP0 [exp(−C∞,0 /k)]) = EP0 [C∞,0 ] follows. Combining with
the reverse inequality, we obtain that
lim
m→∞u
m,
0 = EP0
[
C∞,0
]
= EQ∞,
[(
1 +
C∞,0
δ1
)
C∞,0
]
= (1/δ1)VarQ∞,
(
C∞,0
)
.
Since limm→∞ u
m,∗
0 = 0, limm→∞
(
um,0 − um,∗0
)
= (1/δ1)VarQ∞,
(
C∞,0
)
follows. In order to obtain
the limiting loss for agent 1, note first that taking expectation with respect to P0 on both sides of
C∞,0 +δ1 log (1 + C
∞,/δ1) = z
∞,
0 +C
∞,∗
0 , we obtain EP0
[
C∞,0
]
+δ1EP0 [log (dP0/dQ∞,)] = z
∞,
0 ,
where the fact that 1+C∞,0 /δ1 = dP0/dQ∞, is used. Recalling EP0
[
C∞,0
]
= (1/δ1)VarQ∞,(C∞,0 ),
we obtain the equality z∞,0 = (1/δ1)VarQ∞,(C
∞,
0 ) + δ1H(P0 |Q∞,). In particular, since z∞,0 ∈
R+, it follows that VarQ∞,(C∞,0 ) < ∞ and H(P0 |Q∞,) < ∞. Recall that limm→∞ zm,0 = z∞,0
was obtained in the proof of Theorem 4.4, and that, from (3.9),
zm,0 = λ
m
0 (u
m,∗ − um,)− (um,∗0 − um,0 ) = λm0 (um,∗1 − um,1 )− λm1 (um,∗0 − um,0 ) .
Since limm→∞ λm0 = 1, limm→∞ λm1 = 0 and limm→∞
(
um,∗0 − um,0
)
= (1/δ1)VarQ∞,(C∞,0 ) <∞,
lim
m→∞
(
um,∗1 − um,1
)
= lim
m→∞ z
m,
0 = z
∞,
0 = (1/δ1)VarQ∞,(C
∞,
0 ) + δ1H(P0 |Q∞,)
follows, which concludes the proof.
A.11. Proof of Theorem 4.7. Under Assumption 4.6, δm0 log (dPm0 /dQm,∗) ∼ λ1ξ0 − λ0ξ1 holds
for all m ∈ N; therefore, Cm,∗0 = λ1ξ0 − λ0ξ1 − EQm,∗ [λ1ξ0 − λ0ξ1] holds for all m ∈ N. Since
(λ1ξ0 − λ0ξ1) ∈ L∞ and (Qm,∗)m∈N converges to P in total variation norm, one readily obtains
limm→∞ EQm,∗ [λ1ξ0 − λ0ξ1] = EP [λ1ξ0 − λ0ξ1] = 0; therefore, limm→∞Cm,∗0 = λ1ξ0−λ0ξ1 follows.
We proceed with the limiting behaviour of the sequence (Cm,)m∈N. For each m ∈ N, define
the function (−δm1 , δm0 ) 3 y 7→ ψm(y) := y + λ0δm1 log ((1 + y/δm1 ) / (1− y/δm0 )); it then follows
by (A.13) that ψm(Cm,0 ) = z
m,
0 + C
m,∗
0 , for all m ∈ N. Note that ψm is strictly increasing with
ψm(0) = 0 for all m ∈ N; furthermore, (ψm)m∈N converges uniformly in compact subsets of R to
ψ∞ : R 7→ R defined via ψ∞(y) = 2y for y ∈ R.
Lemma A.7. The sequence (zm,0 )m∈N is bounded in R.
Proof. We shall show that (zm,0 )m∈N is bounded above. A symmetric argument applied to agent 1
shows that (zm,1 )m∈N is bounded above and since z
m,
0 = −zm,1 holds for all m ∈ N, it will follow
that (zm,0 )m∈N is also bounded below.
Recall that EQm,
[
Cm,0
]
= 0 holds for all m ∈ N. As in the beginning of the proof of Lemma
A.4, applying (3.2) for i = 1, and using (3.3), it follows that log (dQm,/dPm1 ) ∼ Cm,0 /δm1 −
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log
(
λm0 − Cm,0 /δm
) ∼ Cm,0 /δm1 − log (1− Cm,0 /δm0 ). Therefore,
0 = EQm,
[
Cm,0
]
=
EPm1
[
Cm,0 exp
(
Cm,0 /δ
m
1
)
/
(
1− Cm,0 /δm1
)]
EPm1
[
exp
(
Cm,0 /δm1
)
/
(
1− Cm,0 /δm1
)] ≥ EPm1 [Cm,0 ] , ∀m ∈ N,
where the last inequality follows from CovPm1
(
exp
(
Cm,0 /δ
m
1
)
/
(
1− Cm,0 /δm1
)
, Cm,0
) ≥ 0, holding
for all m ∈ N. We obtain then that EP
[
exp (ξ1/δ
m
1 )C
m,
0
] ≤ 0 holds for all m ∈ N.
Suppose that (zm,0 )m∈N fails to be bounded above. By passing to a subsequence if necessary,
we may assume without loss of generality that limm→∞ z
m,
0 = ∞ and (zm,0 )m∈N is nonnegative.
Note then by (A.13) it follows that limm→∞ P
[
Cm,0 > K
]
= 1 holds for all K ∈ R+. Further-
more, Cm,0 ≥ −(Cm,∗0 )− holds for all m ∈ N, which, together with the uniform boundedness of(
Cm,∗0
)
m∈N, implies the existence of c0 ∈ (0,∞) such that C
m,
0 ≥ −c0 holds for all m ∈ N. Since
ξ1 ∈ L∞, exp (ξ1/δm1 )Cm,0 ≥ −c holds for all m ∈ N, for some appropriate c ∈ (0,∞). The last
domination from below, combined with L0- limm→∞ exp (ξ1/δm1 ) = 1 and limm→∞ P
[
Cm,0 > K
]
=
1 holding for all K ∈ R+ would imply limm→∞ EP
[
exp (ξ1/δ
m
1 )C
m,
0
]
=∞, which contradicts the
fact that EP
[
exp (ξ1/δ
m
1 )C
m,
0
] ≤ 0 holds for all m ∈ N. It follows that (zm,0 )m∈N is bounded
above, which completes the argument. 
Lemma A.8. Let (zmk,)k∈N be any convergent subsequence of (zm,)m∈N. Then, it holds that
limk→∞ zmk, = 0 and L0- limk→∞Cmk,0 = C
∞,∗
0 /2.
Proof. Let z˜∞ := limk→∞ zmk,. Due to the fact that (ψm)m∈N converges uniformly to ψ on
compact subsets of R and Lemma A.7, it follows that (Cmk,0 )k∈N will have a L0-limit C˜∞0 , and
this limit will satisfy 2C˜∞0 = z˜∞ + C
∞,∗
0 . Recall the inequality EP
[
exp (ξ1/δ
mk
1 )C
mk,
0
] ≤ 0 holds
for all k ∈ N that was established in the proof of Lemma A.7. Furthermore, since (zmk,)k∈N and(
Cmk,∗0
)
k∈N are convergent, and in particular uniformly bounded from below (the latter sequence
of random variables in view of the fact that ξi ∈ L∞ for i ∈ {0, 1}), and ξ1 ∈ L∞, we infer the
existence of c ∈ (0,∞) such that the uniform lower domination exp (ξ1/δmk1 )Cmk,0 ≥ −c is valid
for all k ∈ N. An application of Fatou’s lemma gives EP
[
C˜∞0
] ≤ 0. The symmetric argument from
the side of agent 1 will give EP
[
C˜∞0
] ≥ 0, which implies that EP[C˜∞0 ] = 0. Since 2C˜∞0 = z˜∞+C∞,∗
and EP [C∞,∗] = 0, it follows that z˜∞ = 0. We conclude that C˜∞0 = C
∞,∗
0 /2. 
The proof of Theorem 4.7 can now be completed exactly as in the case of Theorem 4.4.
If L0- limm→∞Cm,0 = C
∞,∗
0 /2 fails, there exists  ∈ (0, 1) and a subsequence (Cmk,0 )k∈N of
(Cm,0 )m∈N such that E
[
1 ∧ |Cmk,0 − C∞,∗0 /2|
]
>  holds for all k ∈ N. Since the sequence
(zmk,)k∈N is bounded due to Lemma A.7, there exists a further subsequence of (zmk,)k∈N that
is convergent. Then, Lemma A.8 implies that there exists a further subsequence of (Cmk,0 )k∈N
that L0-converges to C∞,∗0 /2, contradicting the fact that E
[
1 ∧ |Cmk,0 − C∞,∗0 /2|
]
>  holds for all
k ∈ N.
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